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ABSTRACT
HETEROGENEOUS AGENT MODEL WITH REAL BUSINESS CYCLE WITH
APPLICATION IN OPTIMAL TAX POLICY AND SOCIAL WELFARE REFORM
Peiran Chen
Kent Smetters
In this paper, we develop a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model with
financial friction and incomplete risk-sharing among overlapping-generation (OLG) hetero-
geneous households. The economy is embedded with taxation system and social security
system calibrated to current U.S. economy and tax policy, as well as elastic labor supply.
Our baseline model can match wealth-income disparity and moment conditions in financial
market as well as macroeconomic variables. In baseline setting, the mean risk-free rate
is 1.36% per year, the unlevered equity premium is 4.08%, and Gini coefficient for labor
earning and total income is 0.65 and 0.51 respectively. The equity risk premium is driven
by incomplete risk sharing among household and participation barrier to equity market.
Furthermore, our model can act as workhorse model for policy experiment including debt
policy, wealth tax reform, capital income tax reform and social security system reform.
This paper could be beneficial to policy maker to understand the impact of policy change
to macroeconomy and household-level behavior.
iii
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Chapter 1
Introduction
After the Great Recession in 2008, we have witnessed unprecedented phenomena in
financial market as well as wealth-income disparity on household level. The real interest
rate fluctuated at extremely low level but, simultaneously, the U.S. federal debt-GDP ratio
soared to 46% (held by domestic investors). The correlation between debt-GDP ratio and
real interest rate is near zero or even negative in more recent years. The real per-capita
GDP deviated from its long-run trend significantly. On household level, the distribution of
income and, especially, of wealth are highly concentrated and skewed to the right. Across
the United States, the share of wealth owned by the richest 1% of households reaches
37.8% and share of income earned by the top 1% households reaches 24.4% from Survey of
Consumer Finances (2016). Our questions are: what does it matter to macroeconomy from
debt policy if there exists zero or negative correlation between real interest rate and debt-
GDP ratio; what leads to such a correlation from fiscal policy perspective; and what leads
to such unprecedented wealth-income concentration? In this paper, we provide a workhorse
model that could cast light on the joint effect of aggregate macroeconomic uncertainty and
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idiosyncratic risk on individual household level to financial market; and inter-generational as
well as intra-generational wealth-income disparity. With realistic taxation system and social
security system calibrated to current U.S. legislation, our model can be used to conduct
policy experiment on fiscal policy, tax policy and social security system reform.
The fundamental building block of our baseline model is a dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium (DSGE) model with overlapping-generations (OLG) and heterogeneous agent,
which is the most persuasive framework for analyzing fiscal policy change, tax policy change
and social security system reform. Unlike the canonical representative agent model with in-
finite horizon, the heterogeneous-agent OLG model accommodates life-cycle property into
labor-leisure choice, consumption-saving choice and portfolio choice. It allows for inter-
generational and intra-generational heterogeneity among households, which is necessary to
generate disparity in labor earning, total income and wealth distribution. On the top of
heterogeneous-agent OLG model, we introduce aggregate uncertainty, which could influence
total factor of productivity (TFP) and depreciation rate of risky capital (equity) in the econ-
omy, which enters the one-period optimization problem of representative firm on production
side of the general equilibrium. With this setup, factor prices including economy-wide wage,
interest rate and equity return are stochastic.
Households are heterogeneous along several different dimensions: First, they have to bare
uninsurable labor income shock, which influences their individual working ability. Second,
we have a OLG life-cycle model in which young agent, mid-life agent and retiree with
different age choose different optimal consumption, labor-leisure and portfolio choice. Third,
the initial wealth of agents within same age can be different to reflect intra-generational
wealth disparity. Fourth, agent’s social security benefits after retirement depend on agent-
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specific average historical earning. During working age, agent can use their labor endowment
elastically. Households are price taker and have same rational expectation about factor
prices. In our baseline model, there are more than 330000 types of household.
One primary goal of our baseline model is to solve equity risk premium puzzle and risk-
free rate puzzle as well as matching moment conditions of macroeconomic variables in the
U.S. economy. As for the interaction between factor prices and macroeconomic variables,
our baseline model is designed to match negative correlation between real interest rate
and debt-GDP ratio, which implies a non-Ricardian economy. Our model is essentially an
incomplete market model with heterogeneous market participants. Market incompleteness
results from both aggregate and uninsurable idiosyncratic working ability shock, combined
with borrowing constraint of household and participation barrier to equity market. The
source of aggregate uncertainty in our model includes aggregate productivity shock and
shock to the capital depreciation rate. This stochastic depreciation shock is the key building
block to match moment conditions in financial market.
Solving a heterogeneous-agent OLG model with aggregate uncertainty can be compu-
tationally challenging. There are technically infinitely many heterogeneous agents in the
model economy, and we need to solve their optimization problems for many periods re-
cursively. To solve ”curse of dimensionality”, we accommodate approximation equilibrium
first presented in Krusell and Smith (1998). To improve the robustness of approximation
equilibrium, we present application of Artificial Neural Network (ANN) approximation ap-
proach, introduced by Ferna´ndez-Villaverde et al. (2018), in large-scale OLG model. We
also accommodate high-performance multi-thread computing techniques to solve our model
more efficiently since household optimization problems within each age cohort are inde-
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pendent with each other. Multi-thread distributed computing is accessible through AWS,
Microsoft Azure or NSF PSC XSEDE cluster. We present two solutions: CPU-based hybrid
computing with MPI and OpenMP, and later GPU-based computing with Nvidia GPU on
AWS.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Chapter 2 provides a brief review of the
existing literature and applications of heterogeneous-agent OLG model. Chapter 3 describes
our baseline stylized heterogeneous-agent OLG model with a progressive income tax and
a realistic Social Security system. Chapter 4 explains the computational algorithms in
detail to solve the optimization problem of heterogeneous agents and to solve the overall
model economy for a competitive equilibrium, Chapter 5 presents the calibration of the
baseline economy to the U.S. economy with empirical data from several resources. Chapter
6 presents the result of our baseline economy. Chapter 7 focuses on policy experiments
including fiscal policy change and tax reform. Chapter 8 discusses the role of some minor
building blocks of our model. Chapter 9 makes concluding remark.
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Chapter 2
Literature Review
2.1 Heterogeneous Agent Model
Our article is built on heterogeneous agent model with finite life-cycle, which is also
known as overlapping-generation (OLG) model. However, in this type of model, the aggre-
gate economy and, further, factor price, remains deterministic in the sense that there is no
aggregate uncertainty in the economy. In these models, the household, in general, still has
to bear idiosyncratic working ability shock, which is the reason for precautionary savings.
The related work includes Bewley (1986) , Laitner (1992), Huggett (1993), Aiyagari (1994),
Ros-Rull (1999), Imrohoroglu et al. (1995), Conesa and Krueger (1999, 2006), Storesletten
et al. (2001, 2004), Domeij and Heathcote (2004), Nishiyama and Smetters (2005, 2007,
2013), Conesa et al. (2009). Most of these models solve stationary steady-state equilibrium.
This type of model also allows us to analyze the transition path of some policy change and
the social welfare effect of fiscal policy change.
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2.2 Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium Model
This type of model accommodates aggregate uncertainty to macroeconomic variables
that results in stochastic factor prices. It can be applied to investigate the effects of real
business cycle (RBC), the term structure of debt, and optimal risk sharing across genera-
tions. The computational challenges, however, are significant because the underlying size
of the state space is too large for standard dynamic programming technique. This set of
literature mainly starts from Kydland and Prescott (1982). The assumptions of DSGE
model include perfect competition in all markets, rational expectation of all households
and infinitely lived identical price-taking households. The related work includes Smets
and Wouters (2002), Christiano et al. (2005), Smets and Wouters (2007), Bloom (2009),
Christiano et al. (2011) and Jermann and Quadrini (2012).
2.3 Asset pricing model
One of the major goal of this paper is to provide a realistic explanation for equity risk
premium puzzle and risk-free rate puzzle in asset pricing literature. This set of literature
mainly starts from Mehra and Prescott (1985). Investing in equity looks like such a great
deal when considering the equity risk premium representative agent would require compared
with empirical risk premium. Constantinides and Duffie (1996) shows that risk premium will
increase if the idiosyncratic shock becomes more volatile during economic contraction, which
is the intuition for asymmetry in idiosyncratic shock in our baseline model. Storesletten et
al. (2007) adds two important ingredients to this type of model: the life cycle (OLG model),
and capital accumulation. Gomes and Michaelides (2007) extends this type of model to
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include a production side and inelastic labor supply. An essential question to answer behind
the equity risk premium puzzle is the reason for limit participation to equity market. In
Basak and Cuoco (1998), the author blocks explicitly some agents from participating in
equity market and this model is in continuous-time setting. The closest article to our
paper is Gomes and Michaelides (2007), in which they model limit participation from life-
cycle perspective endogenously and explicit participation cost only plays a moderate role in
equity risk premium puzzle and participation ratio in empirical data. However, Gomes and
Michaelides (2007) and later Gomes et al. (2012) heavily replies on preference heterogeneity
and Epstein-Zin preference to generate difference in participation behavior.
2.4 Advanced numerical solution to dynamic OLG model
With aggregate uncertainty, most dynamic models do not have an analytic closed-form
solution and one need to use numerical solution to approximate optimal solution. There-
fore, solving competitive equilibrium in OLG model becomes a large-scale optimization
problem that requires advanced solution method generally coming from numerical solution
to canonical PDE.
The first canonical method for dynamic model is Perturbation methods introduce by
by Judd and Guu (1997). Perturbation methods rely on first order or higher order Taylor
series expansion of the household policy functions around the stationary steady state of the
economy and a perturbation parameter for optimal policy functions. Although it’s powerful
in some computational macroeconomic models, it’s still a local method and could fail with
binding constraint or large-scale aggregate shock.
Krusell and Smith (1998) introduces an approximation equilibrium, in which household
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uses lower moment of wealth distribution and other aggregate variables to predict factor
prices in the future. If the economy does no have sufficient insurance mechanism for house-
hold towards both aggregate shock and idiosyncratic risk, Krusell-Smith may fail in terms
of small R2 of law of motion of aggregate state variables. Understanding the distortion
in consumption-saving behavior of poor household is the key to the robustness of Krusell
Smith method.
To provide a global and robust solution to dynamic OLG model with realistic aggregate
uncertainty, Krueger and Kubler (2004, 2006) introduce Smolyak method with sparse grid
to restrict computation to key points in the high-dimensional state space to get rid of ”curse
of dimensionality”. There is a single agent per generation and the only asset available for
trade is risky capital. However, with current computing power, this type of projection
method can only be applied to OLG model with around 40 state variables. The reason
is that the growth speed of number of key points reduces to polynomial growth instead
of exponential growth with regard to dimension. In Brumm and Scheidegger (2017), they
extend this idea and add adaptiveness into sparse grid. At the same time. they choose piece-
wise linear hierarchical ”hat” function instead of Chebyshev polynomials as basis functions.
The reason is that global polynomials like Chebyshev polynomials cannot capture the local
behavior of policy functions that are not sufficiently smooth. Piece-wise hat function can
handle local behavior adaptively. Introducing hierarchical surplus and a so-called refinement
threshold allow us to add points only to region where steepness of policy functions is large
enough since adding point to region where policy functions have extremely small steepness
contributes little to improve numerical error. Although Adaptive Sparse Grid (ASG) has
many promising features, it can only solve dynamic OLG model with up to 100 continuous
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state variables.
Another promising method that attempts to solve ”curse of dimensionality” problem in
dynamic OLG model is introduced by Judd et al. (2009, 2011) and based on simulation
on ergodic set of the economy. From Judd et al. (2011), the ergodic set takes the form
of an ”oval shape” and most of the rectangular area in Sparse Grid based method that
sits outside of the ovals boundaries is never visited. When solving high-dimensional state
space problem, this could reduce computational cost dramatically. However, equilibrium
conditions outside this set might then be substantially violated. Hasanhodzic and Kotlikoff
(2013) applies the idea of Generalized Stochastic Simulation Algorithm (GSSA) in Judd et
al. (2011) to large-scale OLG model (80-period).
Finally, advanced numerical method in OLG model can always be parallelized by apply-
ing hybrid computing with MPI and OpenMP or CUDA computing with GPU. The primary
reason is that optimization problem of household within specific age cohort is independent
with other households in the same age cohort. Parallelization can be achieved with multi-
thread computing based on CPU or GPU. For example, Aldrich et al. (2011) shows how to
build algorithms that use GPU installed in most modern computers to solve dynamic equi-
librium models in economics. Brumm and Scheidegger (2017) use hybrid supercomputer
architecture with MPI and OpenMP to apply Adaptive Sparse Grid to International Real
Business Cycle (IRBC) model.
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Chapter 3
Model
The discrete-time economy consists of a large number of overlapping-generation (OLG)
heterogeneous households, a representative firm with constant-return-to-scale (CRS) tech-
nology and a government with commitment technology. The heterogeneity of household
includes initial individual wealth, average historical earning, portfolio choice, individual
productivity and age. Individual productivity exposes to uninsurable idiosyncratic labor
income risk in the setup of Bewley (1986), Huggett (1993), Aiyagari (1994), Carroll (1997).
Household consumption, labor-leisure and portfolio choice are influenced by aggregate un-
certainty through the channel of factor prices (risk-free return, equity return, economy-wide
wage rate) over real business cycle. After retirement, households receive social security ben-
efit which is determined by their average historical earning over working age. Households
can invest in two types of financial asset: a claim to the risky capital stock (equity) and a
risk-free bond issued by government. Firm is perfectly competitive, price-taking, and com-
bines risky capital and labor using a constant returns to scale (CRS) technology, to produce
a non-durable consumption good. The financial market is incomplete with financial fric-
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tion. Time is discrete and one period in the model represents one year in real economy.
We assume a labor-augmenting productivity growth rate µ. In the following model descrip-
tion, individual variables other than working hours are thus adjusted by (1 + µ) to reflect
aggregate productivity growth.
3.1 Household’s problem
The heterogeneous agent’s type can be described by tuple s = (a, b, d, e, i), where a ∈
[0, amax] is the beginning-of-period initial wealth consisting positions in risky equity, which
represents ownership to representative firm, and risk-free bond issued by government; b ∈
[bmin, bmax] is the average historical earning over past working era up to current age, d ∈ [0, 1]
is the share of risk-free bond in agent’s portfolio, e the individual working ability (individual
productivity), i, age of agent. The agent enters the economy and begins to work at age
i = 1, which corresponding to real age 21, retires at IR and live at most up to age I. The
average historical earning, b, is calculated to approximate the average indexed monthly
earning (AIME) to determine individual social security benefit after retirement. In every
period, the household receives an realization of idiosyncratic working-ability shock and they
choose consumption-saving, labor-leisure and portfolio choice to maximize their expected
lifetime utility.
3.1.1 Utility function
In our baseline model, households have constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility
function defined over consumption of a single non-durable good, ct, and leisure time, (1−lt),
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of each period:
u(ct, lt) =
(cαt (1− lt)1−α)1−γ
1− γ (3.1.1)
where γ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion, α the consumption share parameter.
In some canonical asset pricing paper, recursive preference like Epstein-Zin preference
is a powerful choice to match household’s behavior on portfolio choice or to generate par-
ticipation barrier endogenously. Although the intuition of Epstein-Zin preference in DSGE
model is unclear, introducing Epstein-Zin preference adds freedom to model calibration and
preference heterogeneity. The recursion utility function is defined as:
Vi,t = {(1− β)((cαt (1− lt)1−α))1−1/ψ + β(Et[φiV 1−γi+1,t+1])
1−1/ψ
1−γ } 11−1/ψ (3.1.2)
where ψ is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (EIS), which measures responsiveness
of the consumption change to the real interest rate. To introduce preference heterogeneity,
we can allow γ and ψ to vary among different group of household.
3.1.2 Labor endowment
Each period, agents are endowed with one unit of labor, which agents can use elastically.
Suppose lt is the hour of working agent chooses at current period, t, then 1 − lt is the
leisure time, which agent cherishes. The labor income is: wtetlt, where wt is economy-wide
wage rate per efficiency unit of labor, et individual working ability, which is subject to
idiosyncratic risk in working age. Therefore, there is a trade-off between leisure time and
labor income, which is governed mainly by α in utility function. Later, we will show this
trade-off is also influenced by retirement benefit. We assume labor productivity of retired
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household is zero.
Idiosyncratic risk is an essential component for heterogeneous agent model to generate
precautionary savings. From Mankiw (1986) and later Constantinides and Duffie (1996),
aggregate shocks and the volatility of idiosyncratic shocks are negatively related, which is
defined as counter-cyclical cross-sectional variance, or CCV risk. Idiosyncratic risk is also
time-consistent shock, which means household with good realization of idiosyncratic risk is
more possible to receive another good realization.
3.1.3 Financial market, portfolio choice and financial friction
Following growing literature studying asset pricing in a production economy, there are
two types of financial asset household can invest: one-period risk-free bond issued by gov-
ernment and risky investment opportunity in equity. Equity reflects the ownership to rep-
resentative firm in the economy. Risk-free bond acts as safe asset for household to insure
themselves against both aggregate uncertainty and idiosyncratic risk. The risk-free return
of current period t is denoted by rf,t and risky equity return of current period is denoted
by rt. The primary trade-off between investing in these two financial assets is higher invest-
ment return (equity risk premium) and higher risk exposure taken for stockholder. In our
baseline model and later model with rare shock to the economy, we assume there exists a
small positive fixed cost to participate in equity market such that agent with initial wealth
below some level, k, cannot enter equity market for the next period. Therefore, agent’s
participation to equity market is endogenously influenced by agent’s consumption-saving
choice even if k is a calibration target to match empirical participation ratio.
However, we still introduce the potential form of variable participation cost to equity
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market in our model since it has some microeconomic foundation as described in Gomes and
Michaelides (2007), and we simply want to verify that variable cost is not the major reason
for equity risk premium puzzle. The participation cost is one-time entry cost, which takes
form κwtetlt, where κ is the fixed rate on agent’s labor income at the period agent chooses
to participate in equity market. The intuition for participation cost is that agent has to
spend time and effort to, for example, obtain knowledge on equity market, open a trading
account and manage their initial portfolio actively. Once entering the equity market, agent
does not need to pay any participation cost if they have positive position in equity market
and receive rt on their position in equity market. In empirical data, equity market provides
a risk premium over risk-free bond market and therefore agent has to make another trade-off
between participation cost and risk premium. At each period t, household can choose dt+1,
their bond demand as a percentage of their portfolio value for the next period.
3.1.4 Tax on household
In each period, three types of taxation are levied on households: consumption tax,
progressive individual income tax and a Social Security payroll tax. Consumption tax is a
flat rate, τC,t, tax levied on agent’s consumption, ctτC,t. The second type of tax is Social
Security payroll tax, which takes form:
τP,t(wtetlt) = τ¯P,t min(wtetlt, ϑmax) (3.1.3)
where τ¯P,t is the flat Old-Age and Survivors Insurance (OASI) tax rate that includes the
employers portion. Income beyond ϑmax is exempted from The payroll tax. Only household
in their working age is subject to this type of tax. The third type of tax is progressive
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individual income tax. The individual income tax function follows Gouveia and Strauss
(1994):
τI,t(yt) = ϕt[yt − (y−ϕ1t + ϕ2)−1/ϕ1 ] (3.1.4)
where yt is sum of labor income and capital income of period t with fixed deduction:
yt = max{rtat(1− dt) + rf,tatdt + wtetlt − dexemp, 0} (3.1.5)
where ϕt the tax rate limit, ϕ1 the curvature coefficient, ϕ2 the scale coefficient, dexemp the
exemption.
In later policy experiment, we introduce wealth tax into our baseline model. In 2020
presidential election, wealth tax is a popular topic under debate. European countries cur-
rently levy wealth tax on household’s asset beyond some threshold. Type of asset could
include bank deposits, real estate, ownership of unincorporated businesses, financial se-
curities, and personal trusts. Marginal wealth tax rates ranged from 0.25% to 1.5%. In
general, wealth tax is proposed to mitigate wealth-income inequality around the world. For
simplicity, in policy experiment, we apply a flat wealth tax on household’s asset in policy
experiment section.
3.1.5 Social security benefits
After retirement, agents with age i ≥ IR can obtain retirement benefits. We propose a
social security benefit system similar to Nishiyama and Smetters (2013), in which govern-
ment tracks agent’s average historical earning and distributes social security benefits based
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on agent’s average historical earning. This creates another incentive for agent to work in
their working age instead of simply labor income. Then, the social security benefit function
is kinked and equal to:
trSS,t(i, bt) =1i≥IRψt{0.90 min(bt, ϑ1)+
0.32 max[min(bt, ϑ2)− ϑ1, 0.00] + 0.15 max(bt − ϑ2, 0.00)}
(3.1.6)
where ϑ1 and ϑ2 are the thresholds for the three replacement rate brackets, 90%, 32%, and
15%, that calculate the Social Security benefit based on the average historical earnings, and
ψt is the benefit adjustment factor to balance the budget of payroll tax revenue and social
security benefit payment. bt is the average historical earning over past working era up to
current age. It is approximated by:
bt+1 = 1i<IR
1
i
[(i− 1)bt + min(wtetlt, ϑmax)] + 1i≥IRbt (3.1.7)
each period in household’s working era.
However, this type of setting does not accommodate economy-wide wage growth since
the calculation of bt does not take wage growth into consideration. An alternative method
to take wage growth into consideration is introduced by Li and Smetters (2011). Although
our baseline model is detrended with regard to productivity growth, the economy-wide
aggregate wage rate is still influenced by aggregate uncertainty. Following the notation
in Li and Smetters (2011), suppose household retires at age M = IR. Then, the average
historical earning over working age is defined as:
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Y¯t,M =
Yt,1
Y AM
Y A1
+ Yt,2
Y AM
Y A2
+ . . .+ Yt,M−1
Y AM
Y AM−1
M − 1 (3.1.8)
where Y Ai the economy-wide average wage level at age i. In numerical part, a similar way
with Li and Smetters (2011) is to update bt+1 taken aggregate-economy-level wage rate, wt,
into consideration only in the last period of working age IR − 1, since economy-wide wage
rate in Yt,i and Y
A
i is canceled out.
3.1.6 Aggregate state
Since our model has both idiosyncratic risk and aggregate uncertainty, agent’s decision
on consumption, labor choice, portfolio choice depends not only on individual states but
also on aggregate state at each time period. The vector for aggregate states is defined
as Φt = (zt, δt,Ωt, rf,t, rf,t+1), where zt is Total Factor of Productivity (TFP) of current
period, δt the depreciation rate of risky capital, Ωt the wealth distribution across different
type of heterogeneous agent, rf,t the risk-free return of government bond of current period
and rf,t+1 the risk-free return of government bond of next period. The dimension of Ωt is
more than 330000, which is not feasible for computation purpose. In later section, we will
introduce approximation equilibrium to reduce computational cost with lower moment of
Ωt. The approximation vector for aggregate states is Ψt = (zt, δt,Kt, rf,t, rf,t+1), where Kt
is the amount of aggregate capital stock.
Need to clarify why we need to choose rf,t and rf,t+1 as state variables here. First,
agent need to know rf,t to make optimal choice since their current-period risk-free return
from bond as well as tax burden is affected by rf,t. Since our model is a general equilibrium
model, rf,t+1 is pined down by market clear condition on risk-free bond market at current
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period. In equilibrium, rf,t+1 need to be tweaked to match debt-GDP target of current
period. Need to clarify the timing of these two returns on risk-free asset. rf,t is determined
in the general equilibrium of last period and rf,t+1 in the general equilibrium of current
period. However, rf,t+1 only enters household’s budget constraint for the next period.
TFP shock zt follows an AR(1) process, which will be discretized to a two-state Markov
chain, which has a period that matches period of real business cycle in empirical data. The
two state is denoted by zt ∈ {zL, zH}. Depreciation shock δt can take several values with
different probability to match the moment conditions of equity return in empirical data. δt
is identically independently distributed. Our goal here is to match moment conditions for
equity return as well as keeping our model simple without ad hoc assumption. Then, the
law of motion of these aggregate state variables are:
Kt+1 = ΓK(Φt), rf,t+2 = Γf (Φt+1), Lt = ΓL(Φt) (3.1.9)
As for the second law of motion, household need to use it to predict rf,t+2 since rf,t+2 is
a state variable of household’ value function for the next period. The reason for the third
law of motion is that agent need it to predict the aggregate labor supply of current period
since we have elastic labor supply in our model, which changes over real business cycle and
depends on the realization of aggregate state. Need to clarify the timing here: Kt+1 is
determined at the end of period t and therefore only depends on aggregate state variables
at period t; rf,t+2 is determined in the general equilibrium of period t + 1 and therefore
depends on aggregate state variables at period t+1; Lt is determined in general equilibrium
of period t.
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3.1.7 Rare risk in aggregate state
Beyond the assumption on TFP shock in our baseline model, we also introduce the
concept of rare shock to TFP in OLG model in later part. Rare risk to macroeconomy
is inspired by asset-pricing puzzles, which is a collapse that is infrequent and large in
magnitude. Barro (2006) suggests a disaster probability of 1.52 percent per year with a
distribution of decline in per capita GDP ranging between 15 percent and 64 percent. The
data for decline in real per capita GDP is from twenty OECD countries in the twentieth
century. This group of countries covers major economies of Western Europe, Australia,
Japan, New Zealand, and the United States. In 20th and 21st century, the well-known rare
disasters in U.S. include World War I, the Great Depression, World War II and more recent
Great Recession in 2008, which features a shape, large and global decline in terms of GDP
from its long-run trend. However, the deviation from long-run GDP growth trend in 2008
Great Recession is not as large as the first three disasters in the U.S. We think this is due to
fiscal policy during the process of 2008 Great Recession. Then, we modify the TFP shock
as zt ∈ {zL, zH , zR}, and keep stochastic depreciation shock same as baseline model. We
calibration zR to match average decline in per capita GDP in U.S. same as Barro (2006).
3.1.8 Optimization problem
The agent’s optimization problem with type (a, b, d, e, i) is:
V (a, b, d, e, i; Φ) = max
c,l,d′
{(c
α(1− l)1−α)1−γ
1− γ + βφiE[V (a
′, b′, d′, e′, i+ 1; Φ′)|Φ]} (3.1.10)
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subject to the constraints for the decision variables:
c > 0, 0 ≤ l < 1, a′ ≥ 0 (3.1.11)
with law of motion of the individual state variables:
a′ =
1
1 + µ
[(1 + r)a(1− d) + (1 + rf )ad+ weh−
τI − τP + trSS(i, b, a)− (1 + τC)c]
(3.1.12)
b′ = 1i<IR
1
i
[(i− 1)b+ min(wel, ϑmax)] + 1i≥IRb (3.1.13)
From the setup of optimization problem above, the utility of household goes to minus
infinity as consumption goes to zero. This introduces some problem in numerical solution
part. Instead of introducing a lower bound for the value of utility function, we introduce
a mechanism called ”minimum-consumption”, c. The maximum amount for household to
consume is
cmax = (1 + r)a(1− d) + (1 + rf )ad+ weh− τI − τP + trSS(i, b, a) (3.1.14)
If cmax < c, the government will provide c amount to this specific household to consume
in a lump-sum manner. Household cannot save out of this amount. In later policy experi-
ment part, we apply different c to understand the implication of minimum consumption to
macroeconomic variables and wealth-income inequality. For the ”non-minimum consump-
tion” case, c is set to be zero and we assign minimum negative value in compiler for real
number to utility function when consumption is zero.
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3.2 Representative firm’s problem
For the production side, we choose a representative firm with standard Cobb-Douglas
production technology. The firm is owned totally by household and hire labor force from
household. In each period, the representative firm chooses the capital input, K˜t, and the
labor input, L˜t, to maximize its current period profit, taking factor prices, rt and wt, as
given. The firm’s production function is:
F (K˜t, L˜t) = AztK˜
θ
t L˜
1−θ
t (3.2.1)
The firm’s profit maximizing problem is:
max
K˜t,L˜t
F (K˜t, L˜t)− (rt + δt)K˜t − wtL˜t (3.2.2)
The firm’s profit maximizing conditions are:
FK(K˜t, L˜t) = rt + δt, FL(K˜t, L˜t) = wt (3.2.3)
In a closed economy, the factor markets for aggregate capital and aggregate labor are
clear when:
Kt = K˜t, Lt = L˜t (3.2.4)
Therefore, the gross domestic product, which is identical to gross national product, Yt,
is determined by:
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Yt = F (Kt, Lt) = (rt + δt)Kt + wtLt (3.2.5)
As an alternative solution to stochastic depreciation shock, we introduce adjustment
cost to investment into representative firm’s problem. We assume the adjustment cost to
investment takes form:
1
2
η(
It − δtKt
Kt
)2Kt (3.2.6)
and then the one-period optimization problem of representative firm becomes:
max
K˜t,L˜t
AztK˜
θ
t L˜
1−θ
t − (rt + δt)K˜t − wtL˜t −
1
2
η(
It − δtK˜t
K˜t
)2K˜t (3.2.7)
From Gomes (2001), the investment-capital ratio in empirical data is 14.5%. In our
baseline model, η is set to zero.
3.3 Government’s problem
The role of government in our model is to collect tax and other revenue (accidental
bequest), redistribute it to the household and make decision on government debt policy
target. In our baseline model, we assume the government’s tax policy is time-invariant.
The government’s income tax tax revenue TI is:
TI,t(ϕ) =
I∑
i=1
∫
A×B×E×D
τI,t(a, b, d, e;ϕ,ϕ1, ϕ2)dXi,t(a, b, d, e) (3.3.1)
while the consumption tax revenue TC is:
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TC,t(τC) =
I∑
i=1
∫
A×B×E×D
τC,t(a, b, d, e; τC)dXi,t(a, b, d, e) (3.3.2)
and the Social Security (OASI) payroll tax revenue is:
TP,t(τ¯P ) =
I∑
i=1
∫
A×B×E×D
τP,t(a, b, d, e; τ¯P )dXi,t(a, b, d, e) (3.3.3)
and the Social Security benefit expenditure is:
TRSS,t(ψ) =
I∑
i=IR
∫
A×B×E×D
trSS,t(a, b, d, e;ψ)dXi,t(a, b, d, e) (3.3.4)
The budget constraint of government is:
CGt + rf,tBt = Bt+1 −Bt + TI,t + TC,t + TP,t − TRSS,t (3.3.5)
where CGt is the government consumption expenditure, Bt the amount of risk-free bond
issued by the government, TI,t the income tax revenue, TC,t the consumption tax revenue,
TP,t the payroll tax revenue, TRSS,t the social security payment.
For a general equilibrium model, the market for risk-free bond is cleared every period
and government need to specify policy target for risk-free bond supply. In order to match
the correlation of debt-GDP ratio with risk-free rate and equity return, we choose dynamic
target for debt-GDP ratio based on aggregate state instead of zero-net supply or positive
fixed debt-GDP ratio. The next consideration is the volatility of risk-free rate. One of the
major challenge of asset pricing in DSGE model with risk-free asset and risky equity is the
huge empirical difference in the volatility of returns from these two assets. Our dynamic
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target on debt-GDP ratio, which has significant influence on volatility of risk-free asset,
should match the empirical data. Therefore, our dynamic debt-GDP target is chosen to be:
(Dt+1/Yt) = (Dt/Yt−1)
1
TFPt
(3.3.6)
Apart from goal to match empirical correlation between macro variables and factor
prices, the intuition for this dynamic debt-GDP target is from empirical data of TFP process
and debt-GDP ratio series. In Figure 5.5, empirical data for (Dt+1/Yt)/(Dt/Yt−1)− 1 and
1/TFPt − 1 is plotted jointly to justify this rule. A long theoretical literature attempted
to demystify the links between government debt to macroeconomic dynamics. Ricardian
Equivalence claims that government debt has no effect in a frictionless model in Barro et
al. (2014). However, with incomplete market and heterogeneous agent, this is not the case
anymore. Our dynamic debt-GDP target is essentially counter-cyclical policy.
3.3.1 Accidental Bequests
As Nishiyama and Smetters (2014), we assume that the government collects remaining
wealth held by deceased households at the end of period t and distributes it to working-age
household in a lump-sum manner in the same period. Since there exists aggregate shock
in the economy, the government cannot perfectly predict the sum of accidental bequests
during each period. We assume the government’s policy is to keep the mean of net revenue
of accidental bequests zero and accidental bequest account balances in long-run. Each
working-age household receives an accidental bequest q with constant probability η:
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qt =
∑I
i=1(1− φi)
∫
E×A×B×D a
′dXi,t(a, b, d, e)∑I
i=1(1− φi)
∫
E×A×B×D dXi,t(a, b, d, e)
(3.3.7)
η =
∑I
i=1(1− φi)
∫
E×A×B×D dXi,t(a, b, d, e)∑IR−1
i=1 φi
∫
E×A×B×D dXi,t(a, b, d, e)
(3.3.8)
where qt is the average wealth left by deceased households, and η is the ratio of deceased
households to surviving working-age households. On top of that, we assume the household
cannot predict the realization of bequest lottery so as to internalize this bequest into the
optimization problem.
3.4 Recursive Competitive Equilibrium
We first clarify the timing of our model. The household starts current period with pre-
specified initial wealth (consisting of risk-free bond and risky equity), which is determined
at the end of last period. Then, the aggregate shock is realized, including TFP and depreci-
ation rate to equity. The household is price taker of factor prices including risk-free return,
wage rate and risky equity return of current period as well as representative firm. The
consumption, labor-leisure choice and portfolio choice are functions of individual state vari-
ables and aggregate state variables Ψ. Heterogeneous household and representative firm
makes optimal choice simultaneously, with factor markets clear. Finally, a demographic
distribution on household defined on A×B ×D × E × I for next period is determined.
The equilibrium consists of endogenously determined factor prices (risk-free rate, economy-
wide wage rate and risky equity return), a set of cohort-specific value functions, policy func-
tions, and rational expectations about the law of motion of the endogenously determined
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aggregate variables, such that:
1. Representative firm maximizes its one-period profit by equating marginal products of
risky capital and labor to their respective marginal cost.
2. Heterogeneous agents choose consumption, labor and asset allocation to solve their
recursive optimization problem taking factor prices as given.
3. Market clear for risk-free asset, risky capital and labor market.
4. The government budget is balanced every period to sustain a given ratio of government-
debt to output (can be different across different aggregate states or follow some dy-
namic target chosen by government).
5. Laws of motion of aggregate variables are verified in equilibrium.
The proof for the existence of competitive equilibrium in OLG model is extremely diffi-
cult and is limited to linear tax functions, which is not realistic in real economy. In our case,
the existence of recursive competitive equilibrium is verified in numerical solution part.
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Chapter 4
Computation Method
To solve the recursive competitive equilibrium defined in last chapter, we need to use
time iteration method. With a pre-specified error threshold, ε0, of time iteration, our
algorithm keeps track of the difference between Krusell-Smith coefficients of two consecutive
time iterations in the sense of sup-norm and stops when this difference is below this specific
threshold. Inside each time iteration, it can be divided into two parts: optimization and
simulation. In optimization part, our algorithm first uses Krusell-Smith coefficient to form
rational expectation of factor prices conditional on current aggregate state, and then solves
the households optimal policy functions, taking factor prices as given, recursively from age
i = I to age 1, since the agent with age I will die with probability one and therefore has
no continuation value in their optimization problem. For agent with age other than i = I,
we can use the value function of agent at age i + 1 as given. Then, with optimal policy
functions, our algorithm simulates the economy for specific number of periods. The final
step is to run OLS regression on simulated time series for aggregate variables to update
Krusell-Smith coefficients.
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4.1 State discretization
The first step of our numerical solution method is to discretize the individual state
variables as follows: initial wealth space of individual household, A = [0, amax] into J
nodes, Aˆ = {a1, a2, . . . , aJ}; average historical earning space, B = [bmin, bmax] into N nodes,
Bˆ = {b1, b2, . . . , bN}; and L nodes for working ability space by Tauchen and Hussey method;
M nodes for portfolio choice space, Dˆ = [d1, d2, . . . , dM ]. Then, we discretize the aggregate
state variables: aggregate amount of risky equity [Kmin,Kmax] and risk-free rate [r
min
f , r
max
f ].
We choose linear grid for both of these spaces. Need to mention that we choose same grid
for rf and r
′
f since they are both state variables that determine household’s value function
and we need to interpolate on it in optimization part. A general rule of thumb is to choose
interval for individual state variable to cover its ergodic set in simulation. This can be
achieved with trail-and-error.
Here, we assume idiosyncratic shock to individual productivity is transitory and follows
an AR(1) process. The continuous-valued AR(1) process is usually replaced by a discrete
state-space Markov chain in dynamic programming problem. Tauchen’s method in Tauchen
(1986) or the quadrature-based method developed in Tauchen and Hussey (1991) require
the persistency of AR(p) to be relatively small. The error term in AR(p) is assumed
to be Gaussian white noise with variance σ2 . However, their performance or efficiency
deteriorates when the persistency approximates to 1. With large persistency coefficient or
near unit root, Rouwenhorst method has the best performance among these three methods.
Another advantage is that we do not need to make any distributional assumption on error
term. Symmetric distribution for individual productivity shock cannot generate distortion
observed in empirical data.
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4.2 Krusell-Smith Algorithm
Another important ingredient for the numerical solution of this model is the law of
motion for aggregate state variables. It’s the core of Krusell-Smith algorithm. Household
need it to form their own expectation about factor prices for the next period. Although
each household in this economy is a price taker, their policy functions will influence the
factor prices in general equilibrium. Instead of choosing wealth distribution over all types
of agent as state vector (which can be larger than 330000 dimension), which is infeasible
even with some advanced technique like Adaptive Sparse Grid, our solution method chooses
to accommodate the approximation equilibrium methodology in Krusell and Smith (1998),
in which agent only need to know a finite-dimensional vector (lower moments) to represent
the law of motion for all the aggregate state variables. In another word, household can use
lower moments of wealth distribution to approximate factor prices.
Our solution method is built on den Haan (1997), Krusell and Smith (1998), Storesletten,
Telmer, and Yaron (2007) and Gomes and Michaelides (2007). It expands the idea of lower
moment approximation behind these approximation equilibrium solutions. For endowment
economy with only equity, household need simply law of motion for aggregate capital to
form conditional rational expectation. With elastic labor supply from household and risk-
free asset market, our solution method need two extra laws of motion for risk-free rate and
aggregate labor supply. The functional form for this set of law of motion in our baseline
model is:
lnK ′ = q1,0 + q1,1 lnK (4.2.1)
ln (1 + r′′f ) = q2,0 + q2,1 ln (1 + r
′
f ) + q2,2 lnK
′ + q2,3 ln (1 + rf ) (4.2.2)
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lnL = q3,0 + q3,1 ln (1 + r
′
f ) + q3,2 lnK + q3,3 ln (1 + rf ) (4.2.3)
The parameters in law of motion for aggregate state variables and factor prices are
contingent on type of aggregate shock. Need to clarify the timing assumption here. The
predicted amount of aggregate risky capital K ′ is determined with current realization of
aggregate shock and current state variables. The predicted aggregate labor supply for the
current period, L, is determined by the realization of aggregate shock, and state variables
of current period K, rf , r
′
f . r
′
f is determined in the general equilibrium of current period.
Household need to predict r′′f , which is a state variable of their value function for the next
period, and r′′f is determined in the general equilibrium of next period.
In Krusell-Smith algorithm, R2 of law of motion is the major concern. In general, we
want the law of motion that household uses to predict factor prices to match the law of
motion of aggregate state variables from simulation part. The rule of thumb is that the
minimum of R2 in our model should be larger than 95% since we have three law of motions
compared with just one in Krusell and Smith (1998). The intuition is law of motion of state
variable should explain all variance in state variable. If we cannot go beyond this threshold,
we find adding higher moments of state variables could increase R2 dramatically. However,
in our baseline model and later variations of our baseline model, insurance mechanism like
accidental bequest, minimum consumption and, most importantly, social security system
diminish most distortion in policy functions of extremely poor household and therefore the
law of motion we present could achieve relatively large R2.
From Krueger and Kubler (2004), the reason for Krusell-Smith algorithm to be valid or
have sufficiently large R2 is that, apart from the (small number of) agents right at the bor-
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rowing constraint, all agents in the economy have approximately the same marginal propen-
sity to save out of current wealth. Although consumption-saving choice of poor household
could be quite different from less-constrained household to the right, their contribution to
aggregate consumption-saving choice can be nearly ignored since their initial wealth is so
small. However, this is not the general case for macro-finance model with aggregate uncer-
tainty. One of the major intuitions for method based on sparse grid or adaptive sparse grid
is that R2 is small for some heterogeneous agent models without enough insurance. The
consumption-saving choice for extremely poor household could be highly distorted even up
to some less constrained household. There is a recent paper by Ferna´ndez-Villaverde et
al. (2019), in which they use neural network with one hidden layer to approximate law of
motion of aggregate state variables. This approach can get rid of R2 issue in approximation
equilibrium approach. Another advantage of this method is that the training data for neural
network is from simulation, which means the training of large neural network will not suffer
lack of data problem.
4.3 Numerical solution method outline
As a general solution to large-scale OLG model, the numerical sequence works as follows:
1. Specify a set of coefficients for K-S forecasting equations of aggregate variables as
initial guess. Except the first time iteration, this set of coefficients is the output of
OLS of last time iteration with damping.
2. Solve the optimization problem of individual household, backward from age I to age 1,
taken factor prices as given, and using the forecasting equations of aggregate variables
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to form conditional rational expectation on factor prices for the next period.
3. Given the policy functions of household, with an initial guess on demographic distri-
bution over different type of household, simulate the economy for T periods (discard-
ing the observations of first Tpre periods), while keeping bond market, labor market
and risky equity market clear period-by-period. Here, the bond market is cleared by
tweaking r′f , which is a state variable in agent’s policy functions.
4. Use the simulated times series of risky equity return, risk-free return, aggregate risky
capital stock and aggregate labor supply to update the forecasting equations using
OLS.
5. Repeat the last four steps with new coefficients of forecasting equations from OLS
until convergence. We have two convergence criteria:
• Stable coefficients in the forecasting equations for aggregate state variables.
• Forecasting equations with OLS regression R2 above some pre-specified thresh-
old.
4.4 Individual optimization
Given the set of coefficients of forecasting equations of aggregate variables (K,L, rf , r
′
f ),
we need to solve optimal consumption, labor choice and portfolio choice of each type of
household in the economy. The first step is to replace Φ with Ψ with lower moment ap-
proximation. Portfolio choice for the next period is the outer-loop, which means that we
need to solve optimal consumption and labor choice given specific portfolio choice for next
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period and find maximum value function across difference portfolio choice. The inner loop
is to optimize consumption and labor-leisure choice given portfolio choice for the next pe-
riod. To solve optimization problem in inner loop, we present three methods here. The
first one is to choose 2-dimensional discrete grid on feasible space of consumption and labor
choice [0, cmax]× [0, 1] and choose the consumption and labor that maximizes value function
on this 2-dimensional grid. The main issue of this solution method is the relatively large
Euler error in terms of consumption unit. However, the Euler error could be reduced with
well-chosen grid.
The second method is Hybrid Newton method based on the Euler equations of individual
household. Then, combining with the law of motion of the state variables, the first-order
conditions for an interior solution are:
fc = uc(c, l)− βφi(1 + τC)
1 + µ
E[va(s
′; Ψ′)|Ψ] = 0 (4.4.1)
fl =ul(c, l) + we[1− τI,2 − τ ′P ]
uc(c, l)
1 + τC
+ 1{i<IR,wel<ϑmax}
we
i
βφiE[vb(s
′; Ψ′)|Ψ] = 0
(4.4.2)
With inequality constraints for consumption choice and labor choice, the Karush-Kuhn-
Tucker (KKT) conditions of the individual optimization problem are:
fc = 0 if 0 < c < cmax, fc > 0 if c = cmax (4.4.3)
fl = 0 if 0 < l < lmax, fl > 0 if l = lmax (4.4.4)
Then, we combine KKT condition with boundary conditions using method in Billups
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(2000, 2002) and Miranda and Fackler (2002):
CP(c, l) = min
max

fc/uc
fl/ul
 ,
− c
− l

 ,
cmax − c
lmax − l

 = 0 (4.4.5)
where  is a small positive number. In numerical solution, max function and min function
will also be approximated with continuous functions. We can solve the above problem by
using a Newton-type nonlinear equation solver, NEQNF, of the IMSL FORTRAN Numerical
Library in FORTRAN. This library subroutine uses a modified Powell hybrid algorithm and
a finite difference approximation to the Jacobian matrix. In theory. this solution method
could control on-grid Euler error in terms of consumption unit at the cost of much larger
computational cost since vanilla initial guess on optimal consumption-labor may be out of
convergence disk.
The third method is to discretize labor choice with a grid on [0, 1] and solve consump-
tion choice using Brent’s method. In numerical analysis, Brent’s method is a root-finding
algorithm combining the bisection method, the secant method and inverse of quadratic inter-
polation. It has the reliability of bisection but it can be as quick as some of the less-reliable
methods. The third method allows us to control on-grid Euler error for consumption.
4.5 High-Performance Computing
Although we use Krusell-Smith method to avoid using vector of whole wealth distribu-
tion across different types of agent, which could result in ”curse of dimensionality” problem,
the optimization part of each time iteration is still computationally costly. The reason for
this computational cost is: the large number of heterogeneous household, risk-free asset
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market and aggregate shock. However, within specific age cohort, the optimization prob-
lem of different types of agent within this cohort can be perfectly parallelized due to the
independence property since continuation value for next period is known and taken as given.
To conduct parallel computing, we first use Message Passing Interface (MPI) technique. We
then apply Hybrid Computing with MPI and OpenMP to further improve the performance
of our code.
Message Passing Interface (MPI) is a standardized and portable message-passing stan-
dard designed by researchers from academia and industry to function on a wide variety
of parallel computing architectures based on CPU. The standard defines the syntax and
semantics of a core of library routines useful to a wide range of users writing portable
message-passing programs in C, C++, and FORTRAN. There are several well-tested and
efficient implementations of MPI, many of which are open-source or in the public domain.
OpenMP (Open Multi-Processing) is an application programming interface (API) that sup-
ports multi-platform shared memory multiprocessing programming in C, C++, and Fortran.
OpenMP is an implementation of multi-threading, a method of parallelizing where a mas-
ter thread (a series of instructions executed consecutively) forks a specified number of slave
threads and the system divides a task among them. The threads then run concurrently,
with the runtime environment allocating threads to different processors.
The reason for us to introduce Hybrid Computing with OpenMP and MPI is that the
RAM usage with simple MPI application is too large for our High Performance Computing
platform since we need to define policy functions on each thread of each CPU and most
High Performance Computing (HPC) clusters limit the sum of RAM usage on each thread.
With Hybrid Computing, we can just define policy functions on the shared memory of CPU
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(node), where each thread (core) of this specific CPU (node) can have access. The idea is
that: optimization problem within age cohort is first divided with regard to CPU. Within
each CPU, different thread works on subsection of optimization problem. Then, we use
MPI to collect solution on each CPU to master node and propagate policy functions from
master node to each CPU.
Figure 4.1: Hybrid computing with OpenMP and MPI. MPI is implemented to communicate
among different CPU; OpenMP is implemented to manage shared memory on each CPU
with multiple threads. Policy functions are only defined on memory of each CPU.
To further accelerate solving optimization part in time iteration, we accommodate GPU-
based High-Performance Computing technique thanks to Amazon Web Service (AWS).
CUDA is a parallel computing platform and programming model developed by Nvidia for
general computing on its own GPUs. The advantage of GPU-based HPC solution, com-
pared with CPU-based on, is the number of computing thread to run parallel jobs is much
larger. For economic-efficiency Nvidia K80 graphic card, it has 4996 Nvidia CUDA cores,
compared with only 14 thread on Intel Haswell (E5-2695 v3) CPU at PSC XSEDE.
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4.6 Method to accelerate calibration
Although we have applied high-performance computing technique like MPI, OpenMP
or CUDA to accelerate optimization problem within each time iteration, simulation part
within each time iteration still costs considerable computing time. A common setup for
simulation part is to simulate the economy for 10000 period and discard the first 5000
period.
To accelerate simulation part, we present two methods: the first one is ”better initial
guess on demographic distribution”; the second is that we let each CPU simulate based on
CPU-specific historical path for aggregate state and take the mean of those new Krusell-
Smith coefficients from OLS on each CPU. The intuition of the first method is that, in the
common setup, the first 5000 period simulation is conducted to guarantee that the OLS
calculation is based on simulation starting from some realistic demographic distribution. If
we write the final demographic distribution from last time iteration into a binary file and
use it as the initial guess of demographic distribution in the new time iteration, we can sig-
nificantly reduce the number of time period of this pre-simulation part. The second method
is based on intuition from law of large number. On different CPU, the simulation is based
on CPU-specific historical path of aggregate state, which is a realization of same underlying
aggregate transition matrix. With these two methods, computing time for simulation part
can be dramatically reduced.
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Chapter 5
Calibration
In this section, we describe how we map our baseline economy to the U.S. economy.
Since we focus on the interaction between aggregate uncertainty and idiosyncratic risk, we
calibrate the model to annual-frequency data collected from several resource as described
below.
5.1 Household
Household is assumed to enter the economy at the beginning of age i = 1 (real life
age 21) with zero initial wealth. The household lives up to I = 80 (real life age 100) and
retirement age starts from IR = 45 (real life age 65) and they will die with probability 1
after age I = 80, which makes our model finite life-cycle model. The labor productivity
growth rate, µ, is set at 1.8%, which is an approximation to the average growth rate, 1.8%,
of real per-capita GDP from the year 1971 through 2011. Compared with Nishiyama and
Smetters (2013), there is no population growth in our baseline model. Table 5.1 shows the
value of main parameter of the household sector.
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Table 5.1: Main parameters of baseline model
Maximum possible age I 80
Retirement age IR 45
Productivity growth rate µ 0.018
Household survival rates φi Social Security Administration (2013)
Consumption Share α 0.24
Time discount factor β 0.998
Risk aversion (CRRA) γ 3.0
Auto-correlation parameter of
log wage
ρ 0.95
Standard deviation of log
wage shocks
σ 0.22
Median working ability e¯i Estimated by OLS
The conditional survival rate, φi, at the end of age i, is collected from Table 4.C6
2007 Period Life Table in Social Security Administration (2013), same as Nishiyama and
Smetters (2013). The conditional survival rate at end of age I is set to zero. Figure 5.1
shows the density of demographic distribution with regard to age cohort under conditional
survival probability in SSA (2013) described above. The population of agent with age 21
is normalized to be unit 1. Risk aversion parameter is chosen at the middle of canonical
macro-finance literature with CRRA utility function. The share parameter of consumption,
α is chosen to be 0.24 to pin down 1/3 average hour of working of all working-age household.
39
Figure 5.1: Demographic distribution by age cohort
5.1.1 Individual working ability process
The working ability, ei, of an age i < IR household in the model economy is assumed to
satisfy:
ln ei = ln e¯i + ln zi for i = 1, . . . , IR − 1 (5.1.1)
where e¯i is the median wage rate at age i, and zi is the persistent shock, which reflects
idiosyncratic risk. The persistent shock follows an AR(1) process:
ln zi = ρ ln zi−1 + i i ∼ N(0, σ2) (5.1.2)
The median working ability of age i, e¯i, for ages 21-64 is constructed from the 2010
male-worker earnings from Table 4.B6 Median Earnings of Workers by Age in Social Secu-
rity Administration (2013). The working ability profile by age is approximated by a cubic
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function of age i, and estimated by OLS regression over the median earnings of individuals
between age 25 and 61 from Nishiyama and Smetters (2013). The autocorrelation parame-
ter, ρ, of the log persistent shock is set at 0.95. The log persistent shock, ln zi, is discretized
into 9-state Markov chain using Tauchen and Hussey’s method, {ζ1, ζ2, . . . , ζ9}. The major
concern here is to create high individual productivity household to match labor earning
inequality, which is source for other inequality. With equation (5.1.1), {ei,j} is calculated
as combination of both permanent individual productivity and transitory productivity. On
top of that, ei,1 = 0 when the economy hits a bad TFP shock. This reflects asymmetry in
idiosyncratic risk with regard to real business cycle, inspired by Constantinides and Duffie
(1996). The prevalent choice for ρ is between [0.90, 0.98]. We assume working ability after
retirement is zero and force retired household not to participate in labor market. In Figure
5.2, we report the transition matrix for the Markov chain to approximate the idiosyncratic
shock.
Figure 5.2: Transition matrix for idiosyncratic shock
In canonical literature, Tauchen method is the first method to discretize AR(p) process
to Markov process. With larger persistency coefficient ρ, the efficiency and accuracy of
Tauchen method deteriorates dramatically. Tauchen and Hussey method is built on Gaus-
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sian quadrature and can handle large ρ efficiently. As for highly persistency AR(p) process,
Rouwenhost method is the optimal choice and it makes no Gaussian assumption on the
error term. Non-Gaussian assumption is useful in the future to capture right-skewness of
wealth-income inequality without adding entrepreneur.
5.1.2 Household consumption
In general equilibrium with participation barrier to some household, equity return is
priced by the stochastic discount factors (SDF) of stockholder, which can be expressed
as a function of aggregate consumption growth in stochastic pricing kernel. In Campbell
(1999) sample, the covariance between aggregate consumption growth and equity return
is just 0.0037. With more recent annual data from NIPA, this covariance is only 0.0004.
This moment condition is important for asset pricing literature since realistic equity risk
premium can be achieved with abnormally large covariance between aggregate consumption
growth and equity return. One of the major goal of our paper is to show that equity risk
premium is driven by incomplete market and financial friction not abnormal covariance.
The standard deviation of aggregate consumption growth is 3.3% in the 1890-1997 sample
(Campbell (1999)). However, in 1982-2004 sample from Malloy, Moskowitz, and Vissing-
Jorgensen (2006), the implied standard deviation of aggregate consumption growth is 1.7%.
Malloy, Moskowitz, and Vissing-Jorgensen (2006) data is from more recent (1982-2004)
Consumer Expenditure Survey (CES). On aggregate level, the aggregate consumption as a
share of aggregate output is 59.5% from Gomes, Michaelides and Polkovnichenko (2013).
The data is from BEA National Accounts and they classify 75% of durable consumption
expenditures as investment and the remaining 25% as consumption.
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5.1.3 Wealth, earning and income distribution
One of the major goals for this paper is to match a realistic wealth, labor earning and
income disparity and that’s why we introduce both inter-generational and intra-generational
heterogeneity. The Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) is considered the best dataset for
the financial wealth of U.S. families. The SCF is conducted every three years. It contains
the balance sheet, pension, income and other demographic characteristics of families in the
United States as well as information on the use of financial institutions. The latest available
results are those of the 2016 SCF survey. From SCF, the inequality in labor earning, income
and wealth has increased significantly since the 1970s after several decades of stability, which
means the share of the nation’s income received by high income households has increased
a lot over past several decades. This trend is evident among wealth, earning and income,
as shown in Table 5.2. However, due to some issue about top-coding in empirical data,
past literature fails to account for wealth, earning and income disparity as measured by
the SCF. In Table 5.3, we report the Gini coefficients from SCF (2016) and FRED, which
suffers top-coding problem. Gini index in FRED is based on primary household survey data
obtained from government statistical agencies and World Bank country departments. We
also report canonical result implied by model in Aiyagari (1994), which is one of the most
influential paper in heterogeneous agent model.
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Table 5.2: Gini coefficients for income, earning and wealth of U.S. household
Year Income Earning Wealth
1989 0.540232 0.604490 0.790158
1992 0.500777 0.605726 0.785937
1995 0.515152 0.606360 0.790651
1998 0.530136 0.588915 0.799965
2001 0.562329 0.610183 0.805427
2004 0.540069 0.612579 0.809248
2007 0.574159 0.633011 0.816157
2010 0.549490 0.650248 0.845663
2013 0.574237 0.654349 0.850482
2016 0.597706 0.679937 0.859562
Table 5.3: Gini coefficients for wealth, earning and income
SCF 2016 FRED Aiyagari (1994)
Wealth Gini 0.8596 N/A 0.38
Earning Gini 0.6799 N/A 0.10
Income Gini 0.5977 0.415 (2016) N/A
Based on data in SCF (2016), we then plot share of wealth-by-wealth, earning-by-earning
and income-by-income by age bucket. To be comparable with our model, we consider
household with age 21-100. Then, we divide household into 16 buckets with 5-year range,
to smooth survey result. When dividing household into bucket by wealth, income, and
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labor earning measure, the sorting process happens on households within this specific age
bucket instead of the total population. For earning result, we only report household that is
in working age. Th result is in Appendix A.
5.1.4 Aggregate shock
In our model, aggregate uncertainty could influence both TFP and depreciation rate of
risky capital, which partially determine factor prices in the economy. Households are price
taker. The stochastic process for TFP shock is assumed to follow a two-state, [1.01, 0.99],
Markov process and its transition matrix is chosen to match the duration of real business
cycle, which is around 5.5 years in empirical data. The probability of remaining in the
current state is 2/3. Then, the transition matrix of TFP shock is:
2/3 1/3
1/3 2/3
 (5.1.3)
As for model with rare shock similar to Barro (2006), we assume TFP shock follows a
three-state, [1.01, 0.99, 0.85] Markov process with transition matrix:

2/3− 0.01 1/3− 0.01 0.02
1/3− 0.01 2/3− 0.01 0.02
1/3− 0.01 2/3− 0.01 0.02
 (5.1.4)
In our baseline model, we assume the realization of depreciation shock is independent
of the realization of TFP shock although it can be straightforward to add some correlation.
The depreciation shock is independently identically distributed. The probability distribu-
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tion of depreciation shock and amount of depreciation in each state are chosen mainly to
match the first four moments of equity return in empirical data. However, calibration on
TFP shock and depreciation shock is conducted simultaneously to match moment condi-
tions for some aggregate variables, including standard deviation of aggregate output and
aggregate consumption growth, correlation between debt-GDP ratio and risk-free rate, co-
variance between aggregate consumption growth and equity return. In our baseline model,
the realization of depreciation shock is [−0.06, 0.10, 0.34] with probability [0.17, 0.66, 0.17].
The systematic way (p1, δ1, δ2) to pin down this calibration on depreciation shock is:
1. Start from probability distribution [1/3, 1/3, 1/3] and state [0.0, δ, 2 ∗ δ]. Change the
distribution of depreciation shock to match kurtosis of equity return. The coefficient
to pick is p1 and the probability distribution of depreciation shock is [1/3− p1, 1/3 +
2p1, 1/3− p1].
2. Choose distance coefficient δ1 to match standard deviation of equity return. The state
of depreciation shock becomes [δ − δ1, δ, δ + δ1], which is still symmetric at this step.
3. Add parallel shifting δ2 to state 1 and 3 of depreciation shock to match skewness. The
state of depreciation shock becomes [δ − δ1 + δ2, δ, δ + δ1 + δ2]. Since the skewness of
equity return is not large in empirical data, this shifting in state 1 and 3 has small
influence to calibration on standard deviation of equity return.
Another systematic way to calibrate depreciation shock is to set up a three dimensional grid
on (p1, δ1, δ2) and choose the calibration that can match the moment conditions of risky
equity return. The calibration of depreciation shock in our baseline model indicates that
there is 17% probability for the economy to lose 34% of its risky capital. This abnormally
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large standard deviation in depreciation shock is to match volatility of equity return.
5.2 Representative Firm
In our baseline model, the representative firm has the familiar Cobb-Douglas production
function with share parameter of capital stock coefficient 0.36. From the production side,
our calibration goal includes investment over capital ratio at 14.5% indicated by Gomes
(2001). In a closed economy, the final output of the representative firm is the GDP of the
economy. The U.S. GDP data is based on annual NIPA, 1939-2017. The national income
and product accounts (NIPA) are part of the national accounts of the U.S.. They are
produced by the BEA of the Department of Commerce. Empirical data is filtered using
an Hodrick-Prescott filter with smoothing parameter of 400, implied by Storesletten et al.
(2007). The difference is that Storesletten et al. (2007) chooses NIPA from 1929-2007 and
we choose more recent data.
5.3 Government
The government also need to choose tax rates to finance social security system and
government consumption program. Tax rates are chosen to match ratios of revenue of
different types of tax over GDP as well as to fund social security program. Table 5.4 is a
summary of tax rates we choose. All the tax policy is time-invariant in baseline model.
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Table 5.4: Calibration: Tax rate and social security system
Individual income tax ϕt 0.2650
ϕ1 0.8483
ϕ2 1.2343
Deduction and exemptions dexemp 0.1066
Cons. tax τC,t 0.052
Payroll tax τ¯p,t 0.10
OASI benefit adjustment factor ψt 0.62
Maximum taxable earnings ϑmax 1.0487
Replacement rate ϑ1 0.0883
ϑ2 0.5322
The progressive individual income tax function follows the formula in Gouveia and
Strauss (1994). The parameters that control progressivity is borrowed from Nishiyama
and Smetters (2013) to match the curvature. We tweak ϕt to match the ratio of the
income tax revenue to GDP, which is 10% in the baseline economy. The OASI payroll tax
rate is 5.3% for an employee and 5.3% for an employer. The payroll tax rate, τ¯P,t, for
earnings below the maximum taxable earnings is set at 0.10, which is approximately equal
to (5.3+5.3)/(100+5.3) = 0.1007. The consumption tax rate is set at 5%.
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5.4 Financial market
5.4.1 Bond market
The debt-GDP ratio data is from Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED).1 FRED is a
database maintained by the Research division of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. In
FRED dataset, it has two series of historical data about federal debt in the U.S.: federal debt
held by public as a percentage of GDP and federal debt held by foreign and international
investors as a percentage of GDP. We focus on the difference of these two historical data
as shown in Figure 5.3 since our model is essentially a closed economy instead of small
open economy in the literature. From Figure 5.3, debt-GDP ratio is not a constant even
stationary over time. That’s why we believe canonical assumption of fixed debt-GDP ratio
is invalid. In Figure 5.4, time series for TFP change2 also from FRED is plotted jointly
with empirical debt-GDP ratio from 1970-2017. The key moment we consider here includes
the correlation between debt-GDP ratio and risk-free rate as well as equity return.
Figure 5.3: Federal debt held by domestic investor as a percentage of GDP (1970-2017)
1https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/FYGFGDQ188S
2https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/RTFPNAUSA632NRUG
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Figure 5.4: Debt-GDP ratio and TFP change (1970-2017)
Figure 5.5: Debt-GDP change and TFP reciprocal (1970-2017)
As for the proxy for riskfree asset in the model, Storesletten et al. (2007) chooses one
month US treasury bill. Nominal risk-free returns are deflated using the GDP deflator.
All returns are expressed as annual percentage. In this case, the mean of riskfree return
is around 1.3% and standard deviation around 1.88%. Campbell (1999) and later Gomes
and Michaelides (2007) choose 3-month T-bill as proxy for riskfree rate. They report 1.58%
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as the mean and 5.33% as standard deviation. In more recent paper, Bansal et al. (2012)
reports mean and standard deviation as 0.57% and 2.86% respectively. In consistent with
later part of our calibration, we choose annualized return of 90 day T-Bill from CSRP
US Treasury and Inflation Indexes (1970-2017).3. Based on this dataset, the mean and
standard deviation of risk-free rate is 1.31% and 2.57%. We also report moment conditions
for one-month T-bill, 0.82% and 2.27% respectively; one-year T-bond as 1.85% and 3.51%
respectively.
5.4.2 Equity market
In our baseline model, households are not allowed to short-sell against risk-free asset or
risky equity. Therefore, our asset pricing target is on unlevered equity return as described
in Storesletten et al. (2007). In order to calculate unlevered Beta, we assume the effective
corporate tax is 23% and estimated market debt-equity ratio is 2/3 by Storesletten et al.
(2007). Based on these assumptions, the unlevered Beta is 1.513. The proxy for equity
return is the same with Storesletten et al. (2007). We choose Value Weighted Stock Index
with Distribution (1956-2017) from CSRP dataset, which is slightly different from Storeslet-
ten et al. (2007), where they choose same index from 1956 to 2007. The participation ratio
of U.S. household to equity market is borrowed from Gomes and Michaelides (2007), which
is from SCF.
3https://wrds-web.wharton.upenn.edu/wrds/ds/crsp
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Chapter 6
Results
With calibration as described in last section, we report moment conditions in asset
pricing as well as macroeconomic variables, indicated by our baseline model. As for risk-
free asset, key moments are mean and standard deviation at annual frequency. As for
equity return, calibration target takes one step further to include skewness and kurtosis,
which measures the shape of its simulated distribution. As for macro variables, we choose a
set of moments and correlations in macro finance literature to quantify the performance of
our baseline model. The main concern here is to justify equity risk premium is not driven
by abnormal covariance but incomplete market with financial friction. Beyond moment
conditions, we also report life-cycle profile for consumption, labor and initial wealth. The
next step is earning, income and wealth inequality indicated by the baseline model. The
final consideration is the relationship between interest rate and debt-GDP target.
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6.1 Asset pricing implication
Table 6.1 reports the main asset pricing moments indicated by the baseline model, along
with their empirical U.S. counterparts as described in calibration part. This is achieved with
moderate risk aversion coefficient (γ = 3) compared with some canonical asset pricing liter-
ature that chooses extremely large γ, for instance, γ = 10 with Epstein-Zin preference. To
match the standard deviation, kurtosis and skewness of equity return, we focus on choosing
corresponding realization of stochastic depreciation shock. The mean and standard devia-
tion of risk-free rate implied by our baseline model can match their empirical counterparts.
However, the empirical mean of risk-free rate is time-variant and subject to proxy for risk-
free asset one chooses. Our baseline model implies an unlevered equity risk premium of
4.08%.
Table 6.1: Asset pricing moments
Variable Riskfree return Equity return
Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. Skew Kurt Sharpe ratio
US data 1.31% 2.57% 5.17% 11.64% -0.6203 3.0585 0.3337
Baseline 1.36% 2.52% 5.44% 11.79% -0.6405 2.8980 0.3112
Table 6.2 reports moment conditions for macroeconomic variables, including GDP, ag-
gregate consumption, market participation and aggregate investment. Participation ratio
implied by our baseline model is slightly higher than empirical value and this can be solved
by adding variable participation cost. Participation ratio is also a time-variant variable in
SCF. The empirical mean of debt-GDP ratio we report here includes post Great Recession
period, when debt-GDP ratio in U.S. soared. Therefore, the mean debt-GDP ratio implied
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by our model matches empirical mean excluding recession period. The main issue here is
the standard deviation of aggregate consumption. The correlation between debt-GDP ratio
and risk-free rate is also time variant. The number we report here is based on data of more
recent year (1980-2017). If we contains post 1980 data, this correlation is -0.006.
Table 6.2: Macroeconomic variable moments
Variable Moment Baseline Data
Log Agg. Output Std. Dev. 5.60% 5.41%
Log Agg. Cons. Std. Dev. 5.78% 3.52%
Debt-GDP,risk-free rate Correlation -0.1091 -0.2415
Debt-GDP,equity return Correlation 0.2835 0.2609
Consumption,equity return Covariance 0.0003 0.0004
Participation ratio Mean 0.5820 0.5190
Consumption/Output Mean 0.5852 0.5950
SS Benefit/GDP Mean 5.00% 5.00%
Investment/Agg. Capital Mean 14.30% 14.50%
Working hour (unit) Mean 0.3006 0.3333
We feel obliged to mention hitting boundary phenomenon in simulation part of each
time iteration. The method we apply to pin down bond market condition is to choose r′f ,
the risk-free rate for next period determined in general equilibrium at current period, as
state variable. With a grid discretizing the continues space of r′f , there is a corresponding
interval for debt-GDP ratio on demand side. However, if our debt-GDP target from supply
side is not in this interval, we choose two boundary of r′f interval as the risk-free rate for next
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period, which means the existence of mismatch between bond demand and bond supply.
Hitting lower bound means extra demand and hitting upper bound means extra supply.
This method is similar as placing some rigidity on risk-free rate since we never witness
extreme real risk-free rate in empirical data. When hitting boundary happens, we force the
debt supply to match debt demand to clear the bond market. We think this is a problem
associated with financial friction setup. In real world, participation barrier for some U.S.
household is far complicated than assuming a simple barrier based on initial wealth without
variable participation cost.
In later Chapter 8, we present a potential solution for this artificial boundary with
Epstein-Zin preference and well-chosen preference parameters. In this case, the hitting
boundary case is reconciled and moment conditions matches their empirical counterparts.
This Epstein-Zin model shows similar relationship between interest rate and debt-GDP
ratio in terms of correlation we show above and regression analysis in later part.
6.2 Consumption, labor and portfolio choice
In this part, we plot the life-cycle profiles of consumption, initial wealth, and labor
earning for the average household within age cohort in Figure 6.1. The hump shape in
initial wealth with regard to age cohort is mainly due to average working ability profile
described in calibration part. Consumption is smoothed compared with labor earning.
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Figure 6.1: Consumption, Wealth and labor by age cohort
In our baseline model, we model participation barrier as a small positive cost such that
agent with initial wealth below some threshold cannot enter equity market. Figure 6.2 and
6.3 plot life-cycle portfolio decision. The hump-shape in both participation ratio profile and
portfolio choice profile is due to wealth accumulation over life-cycle since household need to
accumulate some initial wealth to overcome participation barrier. The difference between
participation ratio by age and portfolio choice by age reflects the fact that poor people are
the main participant in bond market in this type of participation barrier model.
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Figure 6.2: Participation ratio by age cohort
Figure 6.3: Portfolio choice by age cohort
In our baseline model, we discretize idiosyncratic risk into a 9-state Markov process.
Therefore, in Table 6.3, we report participation behavior, portfolio choice and average
working hour by different working ability group. Labor earning is the source for wealth-
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income inequality in heterogeneous agent model without entrepreneur. Need to mention
here that households are not evenly distributed across these 9 working types but following
stationary distribution of the Markov process for idiosyncratic risk. Type 1 household has
lowest individual productivity and Type 9 household has highest productivity. Participation
ratio is defined as share of population to enter equity market (strictly positive position) and
portfolio choice is define as share of asset to invest in equity market. A clear trend is
that participation in equity market and labor-leisure choice both increases with regard to
individual productivity.
Table 6.3: Result based on working ability type
A. Participation ratio
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Baseline 0.262 0.307 0.391 0.511 0.638 0.740 0.814 0.865 0.899
B. Portfolio choice
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Baseline 0.729 0.727 0.738 0.764 0.795 0.822 0.854 0.883 0.908
C. Working hour
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Baseline 0.097 0.232 0.263 0.280 0.299 0.315 0.325 0.329 0.333
6.3 Wealth, earning and income disparity
In Table 6.4, we report Gini coefficient implied by our baseline model. Compared with
other dataset like Current Population Survey (CPS), SCF does not suffer from top-coding
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problem, which prevents researchers from obtaining additional information about top 10 %
or even top 1% household. Gini coefficient for earning and income is a little bit lower than
SCF data. Our definition of earnings includes only labor earning. In SCF, negative earnings
contribute to higher Gini coefficient compared to other measure provided in the literature.
However, in our model, there is no possibility for household to have negative labor income.
One of the potential reason for negative earning in the data is self-employment, which is
beyond the topic of this paper. With similar reason, non-negative income is the cause for
small income Gini coefficient. However, there is still huge difference between wealth Gini
coefficient in the data and from the model. The reason is that our model does not have
entrepreneur or time-preference heterogeneity.
Then, we report earning, income and wealth share by different bucket sorted by house-
hold’s labor earning, income and wealth. This is a much more challenging task than simply
Gini coefficient. The main finding is that the skewness to the right is smaller in baseline
model compared with real U.S. economy from SCF (2016), which results in smaller Gini
coefficients compared with empirical counterparts. We believe adding entrepreneur into our
baseline model could solve this or we can model asymmetric idiosyncratic individual pro-
ductivity shock, which is also known as Michael Jordan shock. In empirical data, bottom
20% household sorted by wealth level on average has negative wealth but our baseline model
assumes household cannot be in debt.
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Table 6.4: Distributions of Earnings and Wealth in the U.S. Economy
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.9 0.95 0.99 1.0 Gini
A. Distributions of Earning
Baseline 0.000 0.026 0.108 0.227 0.213 0.139 0.170 0.117 0.6508
Data 0.000 0.016 0.106 0.216 0.178 0.132 0.185 0.167 0.6799
B. Distributions of Income
Baseline 0.017 0.070 0.167 0.277 0.191 0.109 0.112 0.059 0.5088
Data 0.026 0.061 0.101 0.166 0.132 0.100 0.169 0.244 0.5977
C. Distributions of Wealth
Baseline 0.000 0.062 0.178 0.302 0.197 0.108 0.103 0.050 0.5013
Data -0.005 0.006 0.029 0.086 0.109 0.117 0.280 0.379 0.8595
The next step is to divide household into 5-year age bucket and calculate labor earn-
ing, income and wealth share by different bucket sorted by household’s earning, income
and wealth within this age bucket. Dividing household into 5-year age bucket is mainly
to smooth survey result. The result indicated by baseline model is in Appendix B. The
empirical counterparts from SCF (2016) is in Appendix A.
6.4 Regression analysis
The sensitivity of interest rates with respect to changes in the level of debt is vitally
important in budget projections of federal government since the level of federal debt to
GDP is projected to rise dramatically over the next decade. In Gamber and Seliski (2019)
at Congressional Budget Office (CBO), it shows that the average long-run effect of debt
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on interest rates ranges from about 2 to 3 basis points for each increase of 1 percentage
point in debt as a percentage of GDP. They estimated the effect of expected federal debt
on expected interest rates using the following reduced-form regression:
ti
(10)
t+5 = β0 + β1tpit+5 + β2tDt+5 + β3Xt + t (6.4.1)
where tDt+5 is the projected five-year-ahead debt-to-GDP ratio published by CBO at time t,
ti
(10)
t+5 the five-year-ahead 10-year rate from the yield curve observed at the end of the month
in which the CBO report containing the projected debt-to-GDP ratio was published. The
regression residual is represented by t. tpit+5 a measure of expected inflation five-period-
ahead at period t. The vectorXt contains additional control variables suggested by economic
theory and used in previous studies. In Gamber and Seliski (2019), dividend yield and trend
real GDP growth are chosen as control variables, to control the effect of equity return and
real consumption growth on interest rate.
In our baseline model, every factor price is in real term and, therefore, inflation effect
is removed. The linear equation we estimate using OLS, at period t, is:
it+5 = β0 + β1Dt+5 + β2Kt + β3∆Yt (6.4.2)
where Kt is aggregate capital and ∆Yt the growth rate in GDP. To run OLS on above
linear model, we can use time series of factor prices from simulation part of our numerical
solution. it+5 is realized five-period-ahead risk-free return; Dt+5 is realized five-period-ahead
debt-GDP ratio. Based on realized data, we also estimate linear relationship between one-
period-ahead interest rate and debt-GDP ratio. Table 6.5 reports result of the reduced-form
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OLS regression. Based on realized data, there exists statistically significant negative relation
between interest rate and debt-GDP target.
Table 6.5: Regression based on realized simulation data
A. it+5 = β0 + β1Dt+5 + β2Kt + β3∆Yt
Baseline β0 β1 β2 β3 R
2
0.0613 -0.2072 -0.0049 0.0090 0.03
(6.172) (-3.574) (-0.865) (0.523)
B. it+1 = β0 + β1Dt+1 + β2Kt + β3∆Yt
Baseline β0 β1 β2 β3 R
2
0.0694 -0.2255 -0.0078 -0.1126 0.10
(6.905) (-4.713) (-1.675) (-6.982)
Using realized data from simulation does not match the intuition of CBO regression
analysis, which focuses on expectation. Beyond simulated time series, we can also use
binomial-tree model to form expected factor prices five-period ahead. In our baseline
model, household has full knowledge about transition matrix of aggregate state. Debt-
GDP ratio target and household’s expectation on factor prices only depend on aggregate
state. Therefore, household use rational expectation on aggregate state variables to form
rational expectation about factor prices five-period-ahead.
Et[it+5] = β0 + β1Et[Dt+5] + β2Kt + β3∆Yt (6.4.3)
From Table 6.6, there exists negative relationship between interest rate and debt-GDP
ratio. This negative relationship is statistically significant and 1% increase in expected
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debt-GDP target introduce around 1 basis decrease in expected interest rate, given other
variables fixed.
Table 6.6: Regression based on rational expectation
A. Et[it+5] = β0 + β1Et[Dt+5] + β2Kt + β3∆Yt
Baseline β0 β1 β2 β3 R
2
0.0363 -0.0115 -0.0163 0.0168 0.68
(29.504) (-2.004) (-29.992) (8.844)
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Chapter 7
Policy Experiment
In our baseline model, we focus on dynamic debt-GDP rule to match correlation among
macro variables and factor prices. Meanwhile, a realistic taxation system calibrated to
current U.S. policy is levied on household to fund social security program and government
consumption plan. With general equilibrium in hand, understanding the implication of
several types of policy change is feasible here. The policy change we consider includes
fiscal policy change, wealth tax reform and capital income tax reform. Average change to
financial market factor prices and macro variables is reported as well as transition path for
those variables. Transition path analysis is almost always conducted in stationary model
without aggregate uncertainty. Since our model has aggregate uncertainty that will affect
factor prices in equilibrium, we use bootstrapping technique to obtain mean transition path
and 95% empirical distribution band.
This section explains three examples of policy experiments based on baseline model.
The economy is assumed to be in a stochastic steady-state equilibrium at the period when
new policy is announced. After the policy change, the economy responds and eventually
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approaches a new stochastic steady-state equilibrium. The general assumption here is that
household cannot predict when government announces new policy and household’s rational
expectation about factor prices in terms of Krusell-Smith coefficients will not change during
transition path of policy change. This means that household cannot re-optimize their policy
functions against policy change in advance.
The simulation for transition path starts from solving general equilibrium in our baseline
model and obtain optimal policy functions without policy change. Then, we simulate the
baseline economy for T period and use the demographic distribution at the end of the
simulation period T as initial demographic distribution for transition path simulation, which
is in stochastic steady-state as we mention above. The length of simulation for transition
path is Ttp and we simulate Ntp sample path with bootstrapping technique, which is one
realization of transition matrix for aggregate state in our baseline setup. The first half of
transition path simulation is under same policy as our baseline model. At the end of period
Ttp/2, new policy change takes effect and participants in baseline economy re-optimize
their policy functions on consumption, labor-leisure and portfolio choice. Need to clarify
here that, when re-optimizing household’s policy functions, we use the same Krusell-Smith
coefficient as that in the baseline competitive equilibrium without policy change. The
intuition behind this is that household’s conditional rational expectation on factor prices
and aggregate variables cannot change instantly and household cannot predict when new
policy is exerted by the government. With new optimal policy functions, we simulate the
economy for another Ttp/2 period with consistent demographic distribution and debt-GDP
target at the end of period Ttp/2.
To extract the net effect of policy change to the economy, for each sample path, we also
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simulate transition path for Ttp period without policy change at the end of period Ttp/2.
Then, we calculate period-by-period change between simulation with policy change and
simulation without policy change. For factor prices including risk-free return and equity
return, we plot the change in absolute value. For macroeconomic variables, we plot the
change rate instead of change in absolute value.
7.1 Debt policy change
In the proposition of Ricardian equivalence, households are forward looking so as to
internalize the government’s budget constraint when making their consumption decisions.
What’s the influence to aggregate variables and individual household choice if the govern-
ment suddenly flows large amount of risk-free government debt into the economy? In this
policy experiment, the length of simulation of transition path is Ttp period and we simulate
Ntp sample path. Suppose the debt-GDP ratio at the end of period Ttp/2 is (D/Y )0. Then,
at t = Ttp/2 + 1, the debt-GDP target becomes (ν + 1)(D/Y )0/zt, where ν > 0. We follow
the method above to calculate period-by-period change in aggregate variables and factor
prices. The assumptions still are: no prediction or internalization on policy change; no
change in belief on conditional rational expectation on factor prices when change happens;
instant re-optimization on policy functions when change happens. Factor prices change is
still in absolute value and aggregate variables in change rate.
7.1.1 Transition path
In the simulation for transition path with debt policy change, we focus on the crowding-
out effect of more federal debt to equity market and macroeconomic variables. Figure
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7.1, 7.2 and 7.3 plot the transition path for aggregate variables as well as factor prices
when government chooses to flow 50% more debt into the system. Figure 7.4, 7.5 and
7.6 plot the case with 100% more debt. From the period-by-period change, flowing more
debt into financial system will crowd out risky equity. Aggregate consumption decreases
at first and then wealth effect in risk-free return dominates, which leads to recovery in
aggregate consumption level. Aggregate output has negative response to flowing more
debt into financial system, both from aggregate labor supply and aggregate capital stock.
Economy-wide wage rate decreases by -0.0092 and -0.021 respectively. Here, we choose
Ntp = 1600.
Figure 7.1: Change for aggregate variables, ν = 0.5
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Figure 7.2: Change for aggregate variables, ν = 0.5
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Figure 7.3: Change for factor prices, ν = 0.5
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Figure 7.4: Change for aggregate variables, ν = 1.0
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Figure 7.5: Change for aggregate variables, ν = 1.0
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Figure 7.6: Change for factor prices, ν = 1.0
7.1.2 Change in moment conditions
In this section, we focus on the average effect to macroeconomic variables when the gov-
ernment increases debt-GDP ratio by certain amount, 50%, 100%. In Gomes, Michaelides
and Polkovnichenko (2012), an increase in the ratio of government debt to GDP of approxi-
mately 25% causes a permanent reduction in the capital stock of 2.1%. In our model setup,
50% increase in debt-GDP ratio causes an average reduction in capital stock of 2.58%; 100%
increase in debt-GDP ratio causes an average reduction in capital stock of 6.54%.
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Table 7.1: Change in aggregate variables and factor prices
Variable Moment ν = 0.5 ν = 1.0
Agg. Output mean -1.10% -2.79%
Agg. Capital mean -2.58% -6.54%
Agg. Consumption mean 0.10% -0.08%
Agg. Labor mean -0.28% 0.11%
Risk-free return (bps) mean 230 311
Equity return (bps) mean 25 66
Wage rate (bps) mean -92 -210
7.2 Wealth tax
A wealth tax is a levy on the total value of personal/household assets. In this section, we
conduct policy experiment on 2% flat-rate wealth tax on household’s beginning-of-period
wealth without exemption amount. The tax revenue from wealth tax can be thrown away
by the government, since government consumption does not enter the utility function of
household for our model, or used by the government to reduce outstanding government
debt.
7.2.1 Transition path without tax revenue to reduce debt
Figure 7.7 and 7.8 report transition path for macroeconomic variables and factor prices.
Introducing 2% wealth tax reduces aggregate capital stock by nearly 16% and boosts aggre-
gate labor supply moderately. However, reduction in capital dominates the effect of labor
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supply and leads to decrease in GDP. Aggregate consumption has an initial increase by 6%
and then goes down following the trend of aggregate capital. Risk-free rate has a moderate
increase by 53 basis points. Equity return increases due to the decrease in capital stock.
Figure 7.7: Transition path with 2% wealth tax
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Figure 7.8: Transition path with 2% wealth tax
Table 7.2 reports the average change in aggregate variables and factor prices. Introduc-
ing wealth tax into the baseline economy results in sharp reduce in risky equity.
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Table 7.2: Change in aggregate variables and factor prices
Variable Moment Wealth tax
Agg. Output mean -5.77%
Agg. Capital mean -16.32%
Agg. Consumption mean -5.37%
Agg. Labor mean 0.76%
Risk-free return (bps) mean 53
Equity return (bps) mean 221
7.2.2 Transition path with tax revenue to reduce debt
In this part, we assume that the government collects tax revenue from wealth tax and
uses it to reduce outstanding government debt. The dynamic debt-GDP rule government
chooses becomes ((D − TW )/Y )t = ((D − TW )/Y )t−1/TFPt, where TW is tax revenue
from wealth tax. Figure 7.9 and 7.10 report transition path for macroeconomic variables
and factor prices. Table 7.3 reports the average change in aggregate variables and factor
prices.
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Figure 7.9: Transition path with 2% wealth tax
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Figure 7.10: Transition path with 2% wealth tax
Table 7.3: Change in aggregate variables and factor prices
Variable Moment Wealth tax
Agg. Output (%) mean -5.83%
Agg. Capital (%) mean -16.35%
Agg. Consumption (%) mean -5.31%
Agg. Labor (%) mean 0.72%
Risk-free return (bps) mean 73
Equity return (bps) mean 222
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7.3 Capital income tax
A capital income tax is a levy on the return from risky equity investment. Suppose the
capital income tax rate is τcit. The amount of capital income tax is τcit(rt − rf,t)(1− dt)at.
In this section, we conduct policy experiment on τcit = 25% flat capital income tax on
household’s investment in risky equity. From the formula for capital income tax function,
it is possible for capital income tax payable to be negative. In this case, household will
receive refund from government.
7.3.1 Transition path without tax revenue to reduce debt
Table 7.4 reports average change in aggregate quantities and factor prices. Adding
capital income tax into the economy leads to considerable decrease in aggregate output,
capital and consumption.
Table 7.4: Change in aggregate variables and factor prices
Variable Moment Capital tax
Agg. Output (%) mean -3.01%
Agg. Capital (%) mean -8.10%
Agg. Consumption (%) mean -4.98%
Agg. Labor (%) mean -0.19%
Risk-free return (bps) mean 51
Equity return (bps) mean 85
Figure 7.11 and 7.12 plot transition path for aggregate quantities and factor prices.
With capital income tax, aggregate amount of capital decreases and Aggregate amount of
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labor also decreases, which leads to decrease in aggregate output. Risk-free rate increases
by around 51 basis points and equity return on average increases 85 basis points.
Figure 7.11: Transition path with capital income tax
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Figure 7.12: Transition path with capital income tax
7.3.2 Transition path with tax revenue to reduce debt
Transition path in this section is the case where the government uses revenue from
capital income tax to reduce outstanding government debt in the economy. Table 7.5
reports average change for both aggregate variables and factor prices. Figure 7.13 and 7.14
plot transition path for aggregate quantities and factor prices.
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Table 7.5: Change in aggregate variables and factor prices
Variable Moment Capital tax
Agg. Output (%) mean -3.67%
Agg. Capital (%) mean -9.70%
Agg. Consumption (%) mean -3.56%
Agg. Labor (%) mean -0.27%
Risk-free return (bps) mean 95
Equity return (bps) mean 106
Figure 7.13: Transition path with capital income tax
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Figure 7.14: Transition path with capital income tax
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Chapter 8
Discussion
In this part, we consider the robustness of our baseline model by changing some building
blocks of the baseline model. First, a model with preference heterogeneity and Epstein-Zin
preference, similar to Gomes and Michaelides (2007), is calibrated to match asset pricing
moments and moments for macro variables. This could be a potential solution to reconcile
artificial boundary for risk-free rate in the baseline model. Second, a model with rare shock
following the setup and assumption in Barro (2006) is calibrated to match asset pricing
moments and macro variables. Then, we focus on the influence of amount of minimum
consumption to the macroeconomy and individual household behavior, especially wealth-
income inequality. The fourth variation to the baseline model is on debt-GDP target, in
which fixed, net positive debt-GDP target is applied to bond market. The fifth variation
is to apply fixed debt-capital ratio target instead of debt-GDP target to understand the
influence of different target for bond market to macroeconomy.
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8.1 Preference heterogeneity
Participation barrier to equity market is always a prevalent topic in financial economics
and asset pricing. In our baseline model, a small participation barrier is applied to match
moment conditions in bond market and equity market. Beyond this setting, introducing
preference heterogeneity is a potential solution to solve those asset pricing puzzles without
assuming explicit participation barrier. Another intuition for preference heterogeneity is
that: hitting boundary case in the baseline model is relevant with participation barrier.
As described above, we introduce preference heterogeneity along with Epstein-Zin pref-
erence. Type-A and Type-B agent each consist 50% of the population. For Type-A agent,
the relative risk aversion and EIS are 1.5 and 0.666 (1.0/1.5) respectively. For Type-B
agent, the relative risk aversion and EIS are 5.0 and 0.05 respectively. The consumption
share parameter is 0.36 for both types of household. There is no positive participation
barrier for either type of agent, which means that participation barrier is endogenous and
generated by life-cycle property and risk preference. The time preference is 0.998 for both
types of agent. The debt-GDP rule is the same with the baseline model.
Table 8.1 and Table 8.2 report asset pricing moments and aggregate variable moments
implied by preference heterogeneity model. Participation ratio is higher than its counterpart
in empirical data and this can be reconciled by introducing variable participation cost in
Gomes and Michaelides (2007). Moreover, participation ratio is time-variant variable with
much higher mean in recent year. Introducing preference heterogeneity and Epstein-Zin
preference removes hitting boundary case in baseline model. The correlation between debt-
GDP ratio and real interest rate is nearly zero since household with different preference
responses differently to TFP shock.
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Table 8.1: Asset pricing moments
Variable Riskfree return Equity return
Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. Skew Kurt Sharpe ratio
US data 1.31% 2.57% 5.17% 11.64% -0.6203 3.0585 0.3337
Baseline 1.36% 2.52% 5.44% 11.79% -0.6405 2.8980 0.3112
EZ 1.34% 2.14% 5.34% 12.06% -0.6267 2.8905 0.2918
Table 8.2: Aggregate variable moments
Variable Moment EZ Baseline Data
Log Agg. Output Std. Dev. 6.32% 5.60% 5.41%
Log Agg. Cons. Std. Dev. 6.48% 5.78% 3.52%
Debt-GDP,risk-free rate Correlation -0.0103 -0.1091 -0.2415
Debt-GDP,equity return Correlation 0.0328 0.2835 0.2609
Consumption,equity return Covariance -0.0007 0.0003 0.0004
Participation ratio Mean 0.7296 0.5820 0.5190
Consumption/Output Mean 0.5570 0.5852 0.5950
SS Benefit/GDP Mean 5.01% 5.00% 5.00%
Investment/Agg. Capital Mean 11.21% 14.30% 14.50%
Working hour (unit) Mean 0.3206 0.3006 0.3333
Table 8.3 and 8.4 report CBO regression analysis. For regression based on realized data,
the coefficient for debt-GDP ratio is significantly negative. However, for the case based on
conditional rational expectation, The coefficient is significantly positive due to the influence
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of aggregate capital stock and GDP change. If we regress only on the first two variables,
the coefficient for debt-GDP ratio is still negative.
Table 8.3: Regression based on realized simulation data
A. it+5 = β0 + β1Dt+5 + β2Kt + β3∆Yt
EZ β0 β1 β2 β3 R
2
0.0492 0.0863 -0.0226 -0.1121 0.226
(11.396) (8.589) (-15.706) (-7.437)
B. it+1 = β0 + β1Dt+1 + β2Kt + β3∆Yt
EZ β0 β1 β2 β3 R
2
0.0778 0.0935 -0.0340 0.0605 0.463
(21.128) (11.260) (-28.294) (4.724)
Table 8.4: Regression based on rational expectation
A. Et[it+5] = β0 + β1Et[Dt+5] + β2Kt + β3∆Yt
EZ β0 β1 β2 β3 R
2
0.0459 0.0367 -0.0164 0.0193 0.674
(29.927) (10.268) (-31.170) (3.550)
8.2 Model with Rare Shock
Table 8.5 reports the main asset pricing moments implied by the rare shock model, along
with their empirical U.S. counterparts as described in calibration part. Compared with the
baseline model, the only difference is to add rare risk in TFP shock.
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Table 8.5: Asset pricing moments
Variable Riskfree return Equity return
Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. Skew Kurt
US data 1.31% 2.57% 5.17% 11.64% -0.6203 3.0585
Rare shock 1.76% 2.49% 6.56% 11.64% -0.6834 3.0328
8.2.1 Asset pricing implications
Table 8.6 reports moment conditions for macro variables indicated by model with rare
shock with their empirical U.S. counterparts.
Table 8.6: Aggregate variable moments
Variable Moment Rare Data
Log Agg. Output Std. Dev. 6.52% 5.41%
∆ Agg. Consumption Std. Dev. 5.32% 3.30%
Debt-GDP,risk-free rate Correlation -0.2501 -0.2415
Consumption,equity return Covariance 0.0028 0.0004
Participation ratio Mean 0.5916 0.5190
Consumption/Output Mean 0.6286 0.5950
Investment/Agg. Capital Mean 13.92% 14.50%
∆AHW, ∆w Correlation 0.115 0.06
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8.2.2 Life-cycle profile for optimal choice of household
Figure 8.1, 8.2 and 8.3 plot the life-cycle profile for consumption, labor choice, initial
wealth, participation ratio and portfolio choice.
Figure 8.1: Consumption-Wealth-labor by age cohort
Figure 8.2: Participation ratio by age cohort
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Figure 8.3: Portfolio choice by age cohort
8.3 Minimum consumption
In our baseline model, the government operates a minimum consumption program to
ensure that poor household with zero total income will not have zero consumption. This
minimum consumption program both has economic meaning and stabilizes numerical so-
lution. This experiment is to increase minimum consumption amount to understand the
role of minimum consumption in wealth, earning and income disparity. Compared with
baseline model, we keep other parameters except the amount of minimum consumption the
same and choose different amount of minimum consumption. In our baseline model, the
minimum consumption is set at 0.001 model unit, which is around 140 in real dollar value.
Beyond this, we calibrate another two model with minimum consumption at 0.01 and 0.03,
which is around $5000 per year. Similarly, we also calibrate a model with extremely low
minimum consumption amount. Instead of placing a explicit lower bound for consumption
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in model unit, we place a lower bound for utility function, when consumption is zero, since
utility function goes to minus infinity as consumption goes to zero. We choose an ad-hoc
value for this lower bound as -10000.0.
Table 8.7 reports asset pricing moments indicated with model with different minimum
consumption policy. Table 8.8 reports moment conditions for macroeconomic variables.
From moment conditions, less minimum consumption forces household to save in terms of
both equity and risk-free bond. Minimum consumption could act as safe asset to substitute
risk-free bond for poor household. More minimum consumption also leads to less average
hour of working, less participation to equity market.
Table 8.7: Asset pricing moments
Variable Riskfree return Equity return
Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. Skew Kurt
US data 1.31% 2.57% 5.17% 11.64% -0.6203 3.0585
Baseline 1.36% 2.52% 5.44% 11.79% -0.6405 2.8980
10X 1.16% 3.06% 6.16% 11.77% -0.6405 2.8997
30X 0.94% 3.16% 6.90% 11.77% -0.6285 2.8960
No min 1.41% 1.46% 4.55% 11.79% -0.6555 2.8998
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Table 8.8: Macroeconomic variable moments
Variable Moment Baseline 10X 30X No min
log GDP Std. Dev. 5.60% 5.70% 5.65% 5.61
∆ Cons Std. Dev. 5.94% 5.62% 5.43% 6.53
Debt/GDP ratio Mean 0.22 0.20 0.17 0.24
Debt-GDP,rf Correlation -0.1091 -0.1800 -0.1841 -0.4875
Cons,r Covariance 0.0003 0.0004 0.0007 0.0006
Part. ratio Mean 0.5820 0.5439 0.4900 0.6555
Cons/GDP Mean 0.5852 0.5971 0.6162 0.5658
Working hour (unit) Mean 0.3006 0.2856 0.2413 0.3022
We then compare consumption-saving-labor behavior of household under different min-
imum consumption policy, which is in Figure 8.4. With less amount of minimum consump-
tion, household on average increase their saving in terms of a combination of risky equity
and risk-free bond against uncertainty.
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Figure 8.4: Average initial wealth by age cohort comparison
Table 8.9 reports distributions of labor earnings, total income and wealth by different
minimum consumption policy. In general, more minimum consumption increases inequality
in labor earning, income and wealth. When low-individual-productivity households have
access to more minimum consumption, they tend to work less and just rely on minimum
consumption.
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Table 8.9: Distributions of Earnings and Wealth in the model economy
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.9 0.95 0.99 1.0 Gini
A. Distributions of Earning
Baseline 0.000 0.026 0.108 0.227 0.212 0.139 0.171 0.117 0.6508
Data 0.000 0.016 0.106 0.216 0.178 0.132 0.185 0.167 0.6799
10X 0.000 0.024 0.106 0.225 0.214 0.140 0.173 0.19 0.6562
30X 0.000 0.001 0.103 0.231 0.221 0.144 0.177 0.122 0.6803
No minimum 0.000 0.026 0.109 0.229 0.211 0.138 0.170 0.117 0.6476
B. Distributions of Income
Baseline 0.017 0.070 0.167 0.277 0.191 0.109 0.112 0.059 0.5088
Data 0.026 0.061 0.101 0.166 0.132 0.100 0.169 0.244 0.5977
10X 0.015 0.057 0.157 0.279 0.198 0.114 0.118 0.062 0.5219
30X 0.008 0.039 0.143 0.285 0.209 0.122 0.128 0.066 0.5692
No minimum 0.022 0.097 0.179 0.268 0.177 0.100 0.103 0.054 0.4453
C. Distributions of Wealth
Baseline 0.000 0.062 0.178 0.302 0.197 0.108 0.103 0.050 0.5013
Data -0.005 0.006 0.029 0.086 0.109 0.117 0.280 0.379 0.8595
10X 0.000 0.041 0.176 0.302 0.204 0.115 0.110 0.054 0.5345
30X 0.000 0.017 0.151 0.311 0.218 0.123 0.121 0.059 0.5847
No minimum 0.010 0.100 0.193 0.283 0.181 0.097 0.091 0.045 0.4365
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8.4 Debt-GDP ratio target
In our baseline model, we apply a dynamic debt-GDP target to match dynamic property
of bond market empirically. However, this is not the most prevalent assumption in past
literature. Researchers almost always assume fixed ratio of debt-GDP target, net zero
supply or net positive supply. For example Storesletten et al. (2007) assumes net zero
supply; Gomes and Michaelides (2007) assumes net positive supply. If net zero supply, this
means, in general equilibrium, representative household, if exists, invests all its asset in
risky equity. However, from empirical data, federal debt is in net positive supply. To test
the implication of fixed debt-GDP ratio, we also calibrate a model similar to our baseline
model but assume fixed debt-GDP target, which matches the empirical mean of risk-free
rate. Other implied moment conditions are also listed in Table 8.10 and 8.11 below.
Table 8.10: Asset pricing moments
Variable Riskfree return Equity return
Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. Skew Kurt
US data 1.31% 2.57% 5.17% 11.64% -0.6203 3.0585
Baseline 1.36% 2.52% 5.44% 11.79% -0.6405 2.8980
D/Y=0.215 1.32% 2.92% 5.33% 11.74% -0.6381 2.8708
D/Y=0.25 2.87% 1.91% 5.35% 11.72% -0.6388 2.8714
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Table 8.11: Aggregate variable moments
Aggregate variables moments
Variable Moment D/Y=0.215 D/Y=0.25 Data
Log Agg. Output Std. Dev. 5.69% 5.72% 5.41%
∆ Agg. Consumption Std. Dev. 6.04% 6.07% 3.30%
Debt-GDP,risk-free rate Correlation -0.6381 -0.4422 -0.2415
Consumption,equity return Covariance 0.0001 0.0001 0.0037
Participation ratio Mean 0.5799 0.5850 0.519
Consumption/Output Mean 0.5838 0.5866 0.595
Investment/Agg. Capital Mean 13.70% 13.70 14.50%
∆AHW, ∆w Correlation 0.1275 0.1257 0.06
Working hour (unit) Mean 0.2968 0.2941 0.3333
Compared with our baseline model, the major difference is the correlation between risk-
free rate and debt-GDP ratio. Hitting boundary phenomenon contributes to this result.
Under fixed debt-GDP ratio setup, increasing debt-GDP ratio target will increase the level
for risk-free return. The crowding-out effect with more supply of risk-free bond to equity
market is nearly negligible in this case. In Table 8.12 and 8.13, we report regression result
following the CBO setup described above. For regression analysis based on simulation
data, the negative relationship between risk-free rate and debt-GDP ratio is statistically
significant. Regression based on binomial model also shows this negative relationship.
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Table 8.12: Regression based on realized simulation data
A. it+5 = β0 + β1Dt+5 + β2Kt + β3∆Yt
D/Y=0.215 β0 β1 β2 β3 R
2
0.5054 -2.0472 -0.0319 0.0421 0.446
(27.509) (-23.048) (-8.200) (3.104)
D/Y=0.25 β0 β1 β2 β3 R
2
0.8115 -2.9545 -0.0314 0.0302 0.285
(15.917) (-14.347) (-11.001) (3.132)
B. it+1 = β0 + β1Dt+1 + β2Kt + β3∆Yt
D/Y=0.215 β0 β1 β2 β3 R
2
0.5126 -2.1587 -0.0197 -0.0189 0.430
(27.504) (-24.750) (-5.169) (-1.378)
D/Y=0.25 β0 β1 β2 β3 R
2
0.8792 -3.1697 -0.0413 0.0373 0.354
(18.223) (-16.405) (-15.480) (4.091)
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Table 8.13: Regression based on rational expectation
Et[it+5] = β0 + β1Et[Dt+5] + β2Kt + β3∆Yt
D/Y=0.215 β0 β1 β2 β3 R
2
0.0613 -0.0305 -0.0291 0.0258 0.736
(22.405) (-2.446) (-51.441) (12.093)
D/Y=0.25 β0 β1 β2 β3 R
2
0.0445 0.0400 -0.0221 0.0189 0.701
(9.615) (2.181) (-47.938) (11.975)
8.5 Debt-Capital ratio target
In our baseline model and model with rare disaster shock, the government chooses
dynamic rule on debt-GDP ratio to supply risk-free asset. The main concern is to match
moment conditions on asset pricing, debt demand/supply and further correlation between
several macroeconomic indicators. In this part, we propose another setup that pins down
risk-free asset market by debt-capital ratio. Our primary concern is still to match level of
risk-free asset to GDP as well as those moment conditions. The debt-capital policy is a
fixed ratio chosen to match the mean return of risk-free asset.
Table 8.14 and Table 8.15 report asset pricing moments and aggregate variable moments
implied by debt-capital ratio model.
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Table 8.14: Asset pricing moments
Variable Riskfree return Equity return
Mean Std.Dev. Mean Std.Dev. Skew Kurt
US data 1.31% 2.57% 5.17% 11.64% -0.6203 3.0585
Baseline 1.36% 2.52% 5.44% 11.79% -0.6405 2.8980
D/K=0.102 1.31% 2.81% 5.49% 11.79% -0.6391 2.8980
D/K=0.30 4.54% 1.39% 5.95% 11.73% -0.6356 2.8962
Table 8.15: Aggregate variable moments
Variable Moment D/K=0.30 D/K=0.102 Data
Log Agg. Output Std. Dev. 6.14% 5.59% 5.41%
∆ Agg. Consumption Std. Dev. 5.95% 5.81% 3.30%
Debt/GDP ratio Mean 0.48 0.21 0.28
Debt-GDP,risk-free rate Correlation -0.2733 0.2013 -0.2415
Debt-GDP,equity return Correlation 0.7312 -0.3185 0.2609
Consumption,equity return Covariance 0.0000 0.0004 0.0037
Participation ratio Mean 0.578 0.5854 0.519
Consumption/Output Mean 0.6019 0.5859 0.595
SS Benefit/GDP Mean 5.02% 5.00% 5.00%
Investment/Agg. Capital Mean 14.25% 14.32% 14.50%
Working hour (unit) Mean 0.2889 0.2963 0.3333
Table 8.16 and 8.17 report CBO regression analysis with debt-capital rule.
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Table 8.16: Regression based on realized simulation data
A. it+5 = β0 + β1Dt+5 + β2Kt + β3∆Yt
D/K=0.102 β0 β1 β2 β3 R
2
0.1022 -0.0524 -0.0234 0.0206 0.166
(24.263) (-10.279) (-8.675) (2.569)
D/K=0.30 β0 β1 β2 β3 R
2
-0.0076 0.4114 -0.0464 0.0803 0.127
(-0.814) (9.608) (-9.773) (4.796)
B. it+1 = β0 + β1Dt+1 + β2Kt + β3∆Yt
D/K=0.102 β0 β1 β2 β3 R
2
0.1407 -0.0457 -0.0546 0.0380 0.455
(41.880) (-11.065) (-25.132) (5.848)
D/K=0.30 β0 β1 β2 β3 R
2
-0.0413 0.2937 -0.0052 0.0160 0.041
(-4.412) (6.176) (-0.987) (0.909)
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Table 8.17: Regression based on rational expectation
A. Et[it+5] = β0 + β1Et[Dt+5] + β2Kt + β3∆Yt
D/K=0.102 β0 β1 β2 β3 R
2
0.0560 -0.0008 -0.0144 0.0111 0.657
(104.512) (-1.225) (-43.201) (10.836)
D/K=0.30 β0 β1 β2 β3 R
2
0.0347 -0.0544 -0.0051 0.0163 0.486
(43.993) (-9.121) (-9.713) (11.268)
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Chapter 9
Concluding Remark
We present a DSGE model with heterogeneous-agent overlapping generation (OLG)
household and incomplete market. The baseline model model can match moment condi-
tions for risk-free asset, risky equity and macro variables in U.S economy. The equity risk
premium is driven by financial friction and incomplete market with heterogeneous partic-
ipants, instead of parameter selection or abnormal covariance between factor prices and
macro variables. The answer to zero or even negative correlation between debt-GDP ra-
tio and real interest rate is counter-cyclical debt-GDP policy. Beyond moment conditions,
our baseline model can match labor earning and income inequality with empirical counter-
parts from SCF (2016). Wealth inequality could be potentially reconciled by introducing
entrepreneur in the future. The heterogeneous-agent OLG model is the main workhorse
model to analyze fiscal policy change and tax policy change. We test the influence to finan-
cial market and macroeconomy when introducing wealth tax, capital income tax and debt
policy change. In general, flowing more debt or introducing wealth tax and capital income
tax could have negative impact on macroeconomy. Robustness of our model is verified by
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modifying debt policy target, preference heterogeneity and minimum consumption plan.
From computational perspective, this paper presents a modified version of Krusell-Smith
(1998) algorithm to solve the large-scale OLG model with feasible computational cost. Al-
though Krusell Smith algorithm works pretty well in our model setup, Artificial Neural
Network approach may replace Krusell Smith algorithm to approximate conditional expec-
tation in some ill-mannered problem with R2 below desired threshold. This improves the
robustness of large-scale OLG model with approximation equilibrium. We also use high-
performance computing technique, like MPI, OpenMP and CUDA to accelerate computa-
tion, which could be a general solution for large-scale heterogeneous-agent OLG model.
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Appendix.A
Figures below is from SCF (2016). We divide households with age 1 to 80 into 16
bucket. Within each 5-year age bucket, we sort the households by their labor earning,
total income and wealth into 8 sub-bucket: bottom 20%, 20%-40%, 40%-60%, 60%-80%,
80%-90%, 90%-95%, 95%-99%, 99%-100%. Earning, income and wealth amount are in real
dollar.
Figure 1: Wealth share by wealth bucket and age bucket, SCF (2016)
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Figure 2: Earning share by earning bucket and age bucket, SCF (2016)
Figure 3: Income share by income bucket and age bucket, SCF (2016)
Figure 4: Wealth by wealth bucket in 2016 Dollar, SCF (2016)
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Figure 5: Earning by earning bucket in 2016 Dollar, SCF
Figure 6: Income by income bucket in 2016 Dollar, SCF
Figure 7: Wealth share by wealth bucket, SCF (2016)
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Figure 8: Earning share by earning bucket, SCF
Figure 9: Income share by income bucket, SCF
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Appendix.B
As described in calibration section, we divide household with age 1 to 80 into 16 bucket.
Within each 5-year age bucket, we sort the household by its labor earning, total income and
wealth into 8 sub-bucket: bottom 20%, 20%-40%, 40%-60%, 60%-80%, 80%-90%, 90%-95%,
95%-99%, 99%-100%. Earning, income and wealth amount are in model unit.
Figure 10: Wealth share by wealth bucket and age bucket
108
Figure 11: Earning share by earning bucket and age bucket
Figure 12: Income share by income bucket and age bucket
109
Figure 13: Wealth amount by wealth bucket and age bucket
Figure 14: Earning amount by earning bucket and age bucket
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Figure 15: Income amount by income bucket and age bucket
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Appendix.C
In table below, we report Gini coefficient and wealth-income inequality implied by model
with preference heterogeneity and Epstein-Zin preference.
Table 1: Distributions of Earnings and Wealth in the U.S. Economy
0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 0.9 0.95 0.99 1.0 Gini
A. Distributions of Earning
EZ 0.000 0.025 0.129 0.216 0.189 0.179 0.146 0.117 0.6452
Data 0.000 0.016 0.106 0.216 0.178 0.132 0.185 0.167 0.6799
B. Distributions of Income
EZ 0.023 0.063 0.144 0.256 0.188 0.130 0.138 0.059 0.5288
Data 0.026 0.061 0.101 0.166 0.132 0.100 0.169 0.244 0.5977
C. Distributions of Wealth
EZ 0.002 0.051 0.143 0.269 0.200 0.138 0.143 0.054 0.5643
Data -0.005 0.006 0.029 0.086 0.109 0.117 0.280 0.379 0.8595
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